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The New Separability
Lili Levi*
ABSTRACT
In Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, the Supreme Court recently
unveiled a new approach to separability. Because copyright law
protects expression, not function, aesthetic features of useful articles are
eligible for copyright protection only if they are separable from the
functional work in which they are incorporated. But the Copyright Act
does not define separability, and Star Athletica is the latest judicial
effort to try to fill that void. Unfortunately, the new separability is
open to a wide range of critiques. Relatively low-hanging fruit are the
vagueness and indeterminacy of the new test, the Court's unsatisfactory
attempts to avoid defining "function," the threat of overprotection
resulting from the opportunistic litigation the Court invites, and the
uncertainty regarding the deterrent effects on overprotection of
copyright's other limiting doctrines.
But there is a deeper, less visible problem as well. By focusing
only on the protectability of the particular designs at issue in an
infringement case, neither Star Athletica's new separability test nor
copyright's other limiting doctrines address the elephant in the room:
the possible market impact of an aggregation of copyright registrations
of design features with slight variations. Varsity Brands registered
two hundred copyrights in variations of its similar uniform designs.
Should this be considered a problem in its market? A strategy of
covering the design field can have powerful foreclosure effects on
markets for useful works, particularly in markets featuring
standardization and high switching costs. Thus, perhaps the most
significant threat today to what Congress sought to protect by adopting
the separability requirement lies not in the individual copyright
registration for an aesthetic design or the individual infringement suit
Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I am grateful to Jon
Baumgarten, Jodi Rush, Andres Sawicki, Steve Schnably, and Ralph Shalom for illuminating
conversations about Star Athletica and comments on prior drafts. Aspects of this argument were
presented at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference in August 2017, and I thank those
conference participants who commented in response. Samantha Finkel deserves gratitude for
able research assistance at the last minute. All remaining errors are my own.
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but in the business strategy of copyright aggregation for aesthetic
elements of functional works in some types of markets.
A saving grace of the vagueness and indeterminacy of the
Court's new approach to separability is that it punted the question of
artistic functionality to lower courts. They can apply downstream
copyright doctrines-originality, exclusion doctrines (such as merger
doctrine, scenes A faire, and the prohibition on copyright for processes,
systems, and methods of operation), and infringement analysis-in
ways that limit the potential overreach of the Court's new take on the
useful articles doctrine in individual cases. But the problem is that
such limiting readings ignore the broader-frame issue of aggregative
registration strategies. Instead of opting for illusory simplicity, the
Court could have gone further to resolve the difficult problem of
functionally integrated expression had it defined function through the
lens of aggregate anticompetitive effects and developed a workable
theory of copyright abuse. While it did not do so, however, its new
separability doctrine does not preclude lower courts from addressing
those issues with a view to Copyright Act goals of protecting
communicative expression, channeling creative works to the right
intellectual property domains, and promoting competition in functional
works markets. Doing so could lead lower courts to expand the kinds
of function deemed to make aesthetic features inseparable for useful
articles cases-thereby ensuring a more realistic conception of function.
Thus, pursuant to the middle-ground approach recommended here,
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural elements with objectively definable
perceptual and neurological impacts when integrated into useful
articles could be considered analytically inseparable bcause of those
impacts. By contrast, a presumption of separability could attach to
more subjective and culturally grounded types of function. In turn,
concerns about anticompetitive effects of aggregative copyright
registration practices could be addressed by the development of a
workable copyright abuse defense to deter such practices where called
for. Courts engaging in this interpretation of the new separability
could well blunt the most worrisome consequences of the Supreme
Court's approach in Star Athletica.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many useful articles constitute beautiful examples of industrial
design, but Congress's intent in enacting the Copyright Act of 1976
(the "Copyright Act")1 was to ensure that copyright would not protect
those articles' utility. At the same time, Congress did not wish to
exclude pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) works otherwise
meriting copyright protection simply because the works were
incorporated into functional articles. Thus, the statute adopted a
compromise position: allowing PGS features of useful articles to be
eligible for copyright protection if and to the extent they are separable
from the utilitarian functions of the articles. 2 Congress stated its
intention to hinge protection on the distinction between copyrightable
applied art and uncopyrightable industrial design. 3 Judicial attempts
to draw that line, however, led to a multiplicity of often-inconsistent
and widely criticized separability tests.4  With upwards of ten
conceptual separability tests deployed singly or in combination by
different circuits5 after the Court's iconic decision granting protection
to dancer statuettes used as lamps in Mazer v. Stein in 1954,6 courts
effectively "twisted themselves into knots"' in trying to draw the line
between uncopyrightable industrial design and protectable applied
art.
Enter the Supreme Court's recent decision in Star Athletica v.
Varsity Brands,8 which sought to "resolve widespread disagreement"
over separability by unveiling a new approach that explicitly rejected
several important lines of precedent. In the context of cheerleading
1. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
2. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5668.
4. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, "Courts Have Twisted Themselves into Knots": U.S.
Copyright Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2016); Shira Perlmutter,
Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SocY
U.S.A. 339, 340-41 (1990).
5. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484-85, 487 (6th Cir.
2015) (identifying nine prior tests and adding a tenth), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017); see also
Shubha Ghosh, Remapping Copyright Functionality: The Quixotic Search for a Unified Test for
Severability for PGS Works, 39 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 90, 97 (2017); Ginsburg, supra note 4, at
18; Sepehr Shahshahani, The Design of Useful Article Exclusion: A Way Out of the Mess, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOc'Y U.S.A. 859, 871-72 (2010) (describing 11 tests).
6. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 202, 217 (1954).
7. See Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 478 (quoting Inhale, Inc. v. Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc.,
755 F.3d 1038, 1041 n.2 (9th Cir. 2014)).
8. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
9. Id.
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uniform designs that featured optical illusions to make their wearers
look thin and athletic, the Court offered a two-step test, holding that
a feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright
protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional
work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work-either on its own or fixed in some other
tangible medium of expression-if it were imagined separately from the useful
article into which it is incorporated. 10
A desire for consistency in legal doctrine is understandable, as
is the intuition that work otherwise fully eligible for copyright
protection should not be punished simply because of its incorporation
into a useful article-especially as one of the rights granted to a
copyright owner by statute is the right to reproduce her work in any
medium whatsoever." Contrary to its goal, however, Star Athletica
has not eliminated the complexity entailed by hybrid, artistically
functional works. In addition to the elusiveness of the case in its own
context, 12 the vagueness and indeterminacy of the new separability
inquiry are self-evident. This is particularly problematic because of
the Court's decision to reject the major pre-Star Athletica
benchmarks, leaving no other jurisprudential tools available to
subsequent courts.
Although it need not be read this way, the Star Athletica
approach will likely lead to extensive overprotection of useful works
through strategic deployment of copyright in incorporated expressive
designs. 13  Indeed, the one certainty is that the case will invite
opportunistic litigation attempting to expand copyright protection for
fashion and other contexts of attractive design. For example, many in
10. Id.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012) ("[T]he exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work in copies under section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work
in or on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.").
12. Even in its own context, Star Athletica is an elusive decision. Depending on how one
frames it, the Court's new standard can reasonably be read in three different ways-as a narrow
and unexceptionable case that comes out the way it would have under application of traditional
doctrine regarding copyrightability of fabric designs, see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 21-24 and
sources cited therein; as a significant but generally beneficial alternative to separability's
doctrinal "mess," see Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 871; or as a major shift inviting extensive
overprotection of functional works in ways contrary to the overall structure of the intellectual
property (IP) regime. See, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Forgetting
Functionality, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 119, 119 (2017) [hereinafter Buccafusco & Fromer,
Forgetting Functionality]; Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality Screens, 103
VA. L. REV. 1293, 1296-97 (2017) (identifying filtering, exclusion, and threshold functionality
screens used in IP doctrines); see also Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion's
Function in Intellectual Property Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 53 (2017) [hereinafter
Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function].
13. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1360.
2018] 713
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
the traditional fashion industry see the Court's approach as an
invitation to significantly expanded copyright protection for apparel. 1 4
They have already taken to the courts in order to cripple the
multimillion-dollar knockoff design industry.15 Whatever the outcome
of particular litigation, the lack of clarity in the standard will
undoubtedly lead to chilling effects and de facto overprotection. The
recent dismissal of the Star Athletica case on remand as a result of a
settlement agreement between Varsity Brands and Star Athletica's
insurance company-over Star Athletica's own objections-is itself an
object lesson in that regard. 16
Admittedly, a finding of separability does not necessarily lead
to copyright protection, and the Star Athletica Court explicitly stated
that it did not hold the Varsity Brands designs copyrightable.17
Mentioning that it "express[ed] no opinion on whether these works are
sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection . . . or on
whether any other prerequisite of a valid copyright has been
satisfied,"18 the Court effectively invited copyright's other limiting
doctrines to guard against extensive overprotection in the useful
articles context. Such limits include, inter alia, exclusion doctrines
such as originality, merger, scenes & faire, and the prohibition of
14. See, e.g., Helen M. Freeman, A Big Cheer for Cheerleader Uniforms, FASHION
INDUSTRY L. BLOG (Mar. 22, 2017), https://fashionindustrylaw.com/2017/03/22/a-big-cheer-for-
cheerleader-uniforms/ [https://perma.cc/KRN4-TQJ4]; Michael Madison, Two Cheers for
Copyright, MADISONIAN (Mar. 27, 2017), http://madisonian.net/2017/03/27/two-cheers-for-
copyright/ [https://perma.cc/GM6K-CC8D]; Steff Yotka, What the Supreme Court's First Ruling
on Fashion Copyrights Means for the Runway, VOGUE (Mar. 23, 2017, 3:42PM),
https://www.vogue.com/article/supreme-court-star-athletica-varsity-brands-ruling-fashion-
industry [https://perma.cc/4WAC-YZSY].
15. See, e.g., Puma Files Patent, Copyright, Trade Dress Suit Against Forever 21 over
Rihanna Shoes, FASHION L. (Apr. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Puma Files Suit Against Forever 21],
http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/puma-files-design-patent-copyright-trade-dress-suit-
against-forever-2 1 -over-rihanna-footwear [https://perma.cclWJN8-EG82]. Puma's recent
copyright infringement lawsuit against Forever 21 over a line of celebrity-branded footwear is
only the beginning. See id. Wearable technology and 3-D printing will also offer new
opportunities for testing the copyrightability of hybrid works. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lefebvre,
Note, The Need for "Supreme" Clarity: Clothing, Copyright, and Conceptual Separability, 27
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 178-79 (2016); Roy S. Kaufman, Is the US
Supreme Court Decision Regarding Uniforms Worth Cheering for?, TECHCRUNCH (July 26, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/26/is-the-us-supreme-court-decision-regarding-uniforms-worth-
cheering-for/ [https://perma.cclVC3A-Z3ATI.
16. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-02508, 2017 WL 3446292, at
*1, *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2017); see also Bill Donahue, Cheerlearder Uniform IP Case Ends
with Unusual Settlement, LAW360 (Aug. 10, 2017, 1:41 PM) https://www.1aw360.com/articles/
953048/cheerleader-uniform-ip-case-ends-with-unusual-settlement [https://perma.cclV4VB-
PP77].
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 n.1 (2017).
Id.
17.
18.
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copyright for systems, processes, and methods of operation; the
availability of thin copyright protection; and the use of filtering when
assessing substantial similarity in infringement inquiries. 19 How
effective these doctrines will be in the aesthetic useful works context
is an open question. Framing will be outcome determinative.
Elements of the doctrines are themselves contested and have led to
inconsistent results; they too require normative theories to justify the
lines they draw. The Star Athletica Court provided no guidance as to
their comparative appropriateness in foreseeably different kinds of
useful articles cases. We cannot predict whether, and to what extent,
lower courts will successfully use limiting doctrines to promote
intellectual property (IP) balance. Still, they represent useful
constraints on possibly runaway interpretations of Star Athletica.
Nevertheless, Star Athletica presents a deeper and less visible
problem that neither the new separability test nor copyright's other
limiting doctrines can resolve. Both the new test and the other
copyright doctrines are applied on an article-by-article basis in specific
cases. The new separability test encourages courts to hone in on the
specific aesthetic characteristics of the useful articles at issue. But
this particularistic focus means that neither Star Athletica nor
copyright's other limiting doctrines address the elephant in the room:
the possible market impact of an aggregation of multiple copyright
registrations covering virtually all variations in particular styles of
design features to be integrated in useful articles. A strategy of
aggregative copyright registration (designed to cover virtually all
variations of PGS features in particular simple styles) raises the
question of how to deal with possible overall anticompetitive effects of
multiple individually justifiable copyright grants. Such a strategy
could have powerful foreclosure effects in the market for useful works,
particularly in markets featuring standardization and high switching
costs. Even if Star Athletica's new separability test can properly
distinguish protectable aesthetics in an individual case, it completely
misses the issue of the deployment of aggregative copyright strategies
to erect barriers to entry in markets for functional works.
Although the Court noted that Varsity Brands registered two
hundred copyrights in variations of its similar uniform designs, 20 it
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012); Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S.
340, 349 (1991); Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1311, 1325; Michael D. Murray,
Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Schnes d Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works,
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 784-93, 804 (2006). Although not discussed here, fair use and flexibility
as to remedies (such as limiting injunctions) are also potentially available limiting requirements.
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 502-505.
20. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007 ("Respondents have obtained or acquired more
than 200 U.S. copyright registrations for two-dimensional designs appearing on the surface of
2018] 715
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did not even inquire into whether that would create aggregate effects
making it difficult for other entrants in the cheerleading uniform
market to compete effectively with Varsity Brands. To be sure, not
every instance of a design-focused branding strategy reliant on
multiple copyright registrations will pose a copyright-relevant
competitive threat. Was Star Athletica itself an example of
anticompetitive abuse of copyright to entrench market power, or
simply a setting in which one market player's reasonable, style-based
branding strategies would not realistically create barriers to entry for
competitors? 21 Beyond the particulars of the case, the Star Athletica
Court's major error was its failure to see that the real threat today to
the PGS features Congress was trying to protect by enacting the
separability requirement lies not in the individual copyright
registration for an aesthetic design, but in the business strategy of
copyright aggregation. 22
The Court's blindness to the issue meant that it did not assess
possible solutions. Had it done so, it could well have concluded that
an administrative approach is not likely to succeed. The procedures of
the US Copyright Office are not sensitive to the aggregate effects of
registration, and there is little reason to defer to the Office's
registration decisions. 23 On the litigation side, however, the Court
could have explored the possibility of copyright abuse claims as a
their uniforms and other garments. These designs are primarily 'combinations, positionings, and
arrangements of elements' that include 'chevrons . . . , lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals,
inverted [chevrons], coloring, and shapes."').
21. For example, in Star Athletica itself, it is quite possible that the nature of the
cheerleading uniform market is such that Varsity Brands' two hundred copyright registrations
would not have a material anticompetitive effect-because there is no reason to believe that
customers would not switch from the Varsity Brands style of uniform design to aesthetically
different alternatives if contractual constraints were not a factor. See id.
22. Admittedly, the Court was careful to assert that the new separability will not allow
monopoly in functional works or entail "backdoor patents." Id. at 1013 ("Even if respondents
ultimately succeed in establishing a valid copyright in the surface decorations at issue here,
respondents have no right to prohibit any person from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of
identical shape, cut, and dimensions to the ones on which the decorations in this case appear.");
see also Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1476, 1499-1500 (2004)
(discussing channeling to avoid backdoor patents obtained through copyright-patent overlaps).
The problem, though, is that the Court's reasoning does not specify how to avoid such
consequences in markets with standardization in consumer expectations and high switching
costs. See generally Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. 1002. This blinders-on approach meant that the
Court's separability standard does not address the policy concern that moved Congress to adopt
the separability criterion in the first place.
23. See infra Part V.C. (addressing the Copyright Office's processes and the statutory
presumption accorded by the Copyright Act to Copyright Office registration certificates.).
716 [Vol. 20:3:709
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potential redress. 24  Still, as such claims would be brought on a
case-by-case basis, it is not clear whether a copyright abuse approach
alone would be a reliable guard against overprotection.
Another missed opportunity would have been to address
head-on the question of how to define "function" for separability
purposes, given the broad spectrum of possible functions. 2 5 Without
even recognizing other alternatives, the Star Athletica Court implicitly
accepted the narrowest, most mechanical interpretation of function.
This unexamined choice opened the door to overprotection of
industrial design. By contrast, had the Court gone to the opposite
extreme and adopted the broadest, most abstract conception of
function, as recommended by some amici, 26 it would have excluded
from copyright even those aesthetic elements that would have clearly
been copyrightable had they not been applied to useful articles. That
approach, in turn, opens the door to underprotection of applied art.
Between the two extremes, however, is the possibility of crafting a
reasonable middle ground consistent with the statute and
congressional intent. Star Athletica's biggest failure may be that it
missed the opportunity to explore whether it could combat the
anticompetitive use of aggregative copyright registration strategies by
adopting an alternative definition of functionality and crafting a
workable notion of copyright abuse to address such circumstances.
The middle-ground option, as applied in Star Athletica, would
have expanded the Court's approach to copyright-preclusive
functionality by including objectively and scientifically grounded
perceptual impacts of aesthetic elements embedded in useful articles.
This would deter overprotection, whether through individual cases or
by limiting the effectiveness of aggregative registration strategies. At
the same time, by not going to the extreme of characterizing all visual
appeal as functional and therefore uncopyrightable, the
middle-ground approach would protect against underprotection of
artistic features simply because they were incorporated in functional
objects.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the history of
Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands and the Supreme Court's decision.
Part III sketches the Court's rejection of prior separability
24. Such claims could be brought under the doctrine of copyright misuse, although its
contours are unclear and its legitimacy contested. See discussion infra Part V.B.
25. Instead, the Court engaged in the ineffective gambit of trying to avoid defining
function by shifting the analytic focus to whether the art can be non-functional on its own. See
Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013.
26. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 55-60
(asserting that aesthetic elements in clothing which make the wearer look good are thereby
functional and therefore dual-nature features).
2018] 717
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jurisprudence and criticizes the new separability test for its
vagueness, indeterminacy, and inconsistency with the Copyright Act.
Part III then raises the threat of opportunistic litigation pushing
toward overprotection. As an object lesson, that Part engages in a
thought experiment: attempting to apply the new test to iconic prior
conceptual separability cases and to fashion design. Part IV addresses
the Star Athletica majority's strategy for disciplining overprotection by
punting to other copyright limiting doctrines, such as the exclusion
doctrines of originality, merger, scenes & faire, and the prohibition on
copyrighting systems and processes; the grant of thin copyright; and
the use of filtering methodology in substantial similarity analysis for
infringement. Part IV also argues that although all these doctrines
are viable alternatives for constraining a headlong rush to copyright
in attractive useful works, they too are uncertain in application and
require normative choices that Star Athletica does not confront. Part
V expands the frame and identifies the less visible but even more
serious post-Star Athletica threat: the multiple registration problem
for designs in the same style and the possible anticompetitive effects
of aggregative registration strategies in some markets for useful
works. Part V also addresses copyright abuse and reliance on the
Copyright Office as possible responses. Finally, Part VI criticizes the
Court's refusal to define function in the useful works context, explains
why its attempt to focus on the PGS articles' non-functionality does
not work, and suggests a middle-ground approach that expands the
kinds of functions that should preclude copyright protection without
undermining Congress's desire to include applied art under the
copyright umbrella. The Part argues that such a middle-ground
approach would be the most fruitful general response to the
anticompetitive threats posed by aggregative registration strategies.
II. THE STORY OF STAR ATHLETICA V. VARSITY BRANDS
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, two- and three-dimensional
PGS works are copyrightable to the extent they also meet the other
requirements of copyrightability. 27 But useful articles-defined as an
"article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information"-are
not copyrightable.2 8 To the extent that useful articles contain PGS
27. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (2012) ("Copyright protection subsists ... in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression . . . [including] pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works[.]"); see id. § 101 ("'Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' include two-
dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art.
28. Id. §§ 101-02.
718 [Vol. 20:3:709
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features, "the design of a useful article ... shall be considered a [PGS]
work only if, and only to the extent that, such design incorporates
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article."29 In making these distinctions,
Congress was trying to police the boundaries between uncopyrightable
works of industrial design and copyrightable works of applied art.30
The difficulty? The statute did not define either term-or
separability. Furthermore, the Copyright Act was designed to have
two separate sections-Title I for copyright and Title II for a separate
type of protection for industrial design.31 The Act was adopted only
with Title I, however, and the only separate protection for industrial
design addressed by later versions of the legislation was limited to
semiconductor chip 32 and boat hull 3 3 designs.
Varsity Brands is now the largest manufacturer of
cheerleading uniforms. 34 The company has registered hundreds of
designs for cheerleading uniforms with the Copyright Office.35 The
designs represent many variations of color blocking, chevrons, and
stripes. 36  Star Athletica, helmed by a former Varsity Brands
employee,37 is a sports apparel manufacturer and a competitor to
Varsity Brands in the manufacture of cheerleading uniforms. 38 The
29. Id. § 101.
30. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5668; see also Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 2.
31. For a history, see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 9 & nn.33-44. Title II of the copyright
reform bill sought to protect "ornamental designs of useful articles." Id. The House rejected Title
II of the Senate bill, explaining that Title II could not properly be considered copyright protection
within the ambit of the copyright revision process. Id.; see also Pamela Samuelson, Evolving
Conceptions of Copyright Subject Matter, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 17, 46 (2016) (noting the hope that a
proposed design regime which the Copyright Office supported "would prevent industrial
designers from trying to stretch the concept of applied art to get copyright protection").
32. 17 U.S.C. § 902; see also Samuelson, supra note 31, at 71-77.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1301; see also Samuelson, supra note 31, at 77-79.
34. Erin Geiger Smith, Who Owns Cheerleader Uniform Designs? It's up to the Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/30/sports/who-owns-
cheerleader-uniform-designs-its-up-to-the-supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/F6KK-ZYLF];
see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.
Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866).
35. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007.
36. Id. (describing the designs as "primarily 'combinations, positionings, and
arrangements of elements' that include 'chevrons . . . , lines, curves, stripes, angles, diagonals,
inverted [chevrons], coloring, and shapes"').
37. Ahiza Garcia, Give Me a 0! Supreme Court Rules Cheerleader Uniforms Can Be
Copyrighted, CNN: MONEY (Mar. 22, 2017, 7:00 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/22/news/
companies/varsity-cheerleaders-supreme-court/index.html [https://perma.cc/MS7Y-KKG5].
38. Id.
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Star Athletica lawsuit began when Varsity Brands noticed that its
new competitor Star Athletica's catalogue was marketing similar
cheerleading uniforms. 39 In its petition for certiorari, Star Athletica
accused Varsity Brands of either litigating against new market
entrants or acquiring its successful competitors in order to "protect its
cheer empire."40 Varsity Brands sued Star Athletica for, inter alia,
copyright infringement in connection with five cheerleading uniform
designs.41
Star Athletica won at the trial level because the court found
Varsity Brands' designs served the utilitarian function of identifying
garments as "cheerleading uniforms." Therefore, the court reasoned,
they could not be "physically or conceptually" separated under Section
101 of the Copyright Act "from the utilitarian function" of the uniform:
"Without the kind of ornamentation familiar to sports (or
cheerleading) fans, the silhouette no longer evokes the utilitarian
concept of a cheerleading uniform, a garment that is worn by a certain
group of people in a specific context." 42
The US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and
remanded, adopting a purportedly new standard for separability. The
court identified the useful aspects of the Varsity Brands uniforms as
limited to wearability and coverage. 43 Because the chevron, stripe,
and color blocking designs were unnecessary to the function of
covering the body modestly, the court treated them as separable and
therefore copyrightable expressive features. 44 By contrast, the dissent
saw the PGS features as performing other functions-namely,
identifying the wearers as cheerleaders and serving decorative
functions that would enhance the wearers' attractiveness. 4 5 Thus,
39. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *1
(W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007
(2017).
40. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 13.
41. Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422, at *2.
42. Varsity Brands, 2014 WL 819422, at *8-9.
43. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487, 491-94 (6th Cir.
2015), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1007 (2017).
44. Id. at 491-93. As the Supreme Court in Star Athletica described the Sixth Circuit's
reasoning:
[T]he "graphic designs" were "separately identifiable" because the designs "and a
blank cheerleading uniform can appear 'side by side'-one as a graphic design, and
one as a cheerleading uniform." . . . And [the Sixth Circuit] determined that the
designs were "'capable of existing independently' because they could be incorporated
onto the surface of different types of garments, or hung on the wall and framed as art.
Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1007, 1008 (2017) (quoting Varsity
Brands, 799 F.3d at 491-92).
45. Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 494-97 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
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inseparability resulted from the fact that the surface designs were
"integral" to the cheerleader identification function. 46
Varsity Brands successfully sought certiorari on the question,
"What is the appropriate test to determine when a feature of a useful
article is protectable under § 101 of the Copyright Act?"4 7 In a 5-1-2
decision, with the majority opinion written by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit and held the Varsity
Brands designs at issue to constitute separable graphic features of
useful articles. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result, and Justice
Breyer, joined by Justice Kennedy, wrote in dissent.48 The majority
opinion adopted a textualist approach focused on statutory language
and explicitly rejected consideration of copyright policy. 4 9
Rejecting prior lower court precedent, the Court held that
[a] feature incorporated into the design of a useful article is eligible for copyright
protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional
work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work-either on its own or fixed in some other
tangible medium of expression-if it were imagined separately from the useful
article in which it is incorporated. 5 0
The first step requires the court to "spot some two- or three-
dimensional element that appears to have pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural qualities."5 1 According to the majority, that burden is "not
onerous" 52-although the Court did not provide any benchmarks for
guiding that visualization exercise. The second step requires a finding
that the feature "must be able to exist as its own pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work . .. once it is imagined apart from the useful article."53
If the PGS feature "is not capable of existing as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work once separated from the useful article, then it was not
a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural feature of that article, but rather one
of its utilitarian aspects." 54
46. Id. at 495-96.
47. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1823 (2016) (granting
certiorari on Question 1); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at i. The Court did not
grant certiorari on the second question, which was "[w]hether, in determining a copyright
registration's validity, a court should give any judicial deference in addition to the
statutory deference articulated in 17 U.S.C. § 410(c)." See Star Athletica, 136 S. Ct. at 1823;
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at i.
48. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1006-07.
49. Id. at 1010.
50. Id. at 1007.
51. Id. at 1010.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The Court contended that "[a]pplying this test to the surface
decorations on the cheerleading uniforms [was] straightforward."55
Without explanation, it deemed the first prong met: "[O]ne can
identify the decorations as features having pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural qualities."56 As to the second prong, the majority found
that "if the arrangement of colors, shapes, stripes, and chevrons on the
surface of the cheerleading uniforms were separated from the uniform
and applied in another medium-for example, on a painter's
canvas-they would qualify as 'two-dimensional . . . works of . . .
art."'5 7 In fact, the cheerleading uniform designs had been applied to
other objects without replicating the uniforms themselves. 58 The
majority framed the question through the use of a dual "zooming in"
methodology-having zoomed in on the function of the article by
defining it effectively as a dress, the majority then also zoomed in on
the design, thereby distinguishing it from the overall functional
outline of the cheerleader uniform as garment. 59
Although the dissent did not reject the majority's test as such,
it disagreed with the majority on independent existence and concluded
that the designs were inseparable because they necessarily replicated
the underlying useful items. 60 Thus, Justice Breyer suggested that if
the arrangement of chevrons, lines, and color blocking in the
cheerleading uniforms could not be "conceive[d] of . . . separately
without replicating a picture of the utilitarian object," or if separating
out the aesthetic elements would not leave a "fully functioning
utilitarian object in place," they could not be considered separable. 61
55. Id. at 1012.
56. Id.
57. Id. The Court also asserted that "imaginatively removing the surface decorations
from the uniforms and applying them in another medium would not replicate the uniform itself."
Id.
58. Id. The majority rejected the dissent's argument that imaginatively removing the
designs from the uniforms and placing them in another medium of expression would necessarily
replicate the cheerleader uniforms. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I agree with much in the Court's opinion. But..
[e]ven applying the majority's test, the designs cannot 'be perceived as . . . two- or three-
dimensional work[s] of art separate from the useful article."' (quoting id. at 1007 (majority
opinion))).
61. Id. at 1031, 1033. In sum, Justice Breyer said:
[I]f extracting the claimed features would necessarily bring along the underlying
useful article, the design is not separable from the useful article. In many or most
cases, to decide whether a design or artistic feature of a useful article is conceptually
separate from the article itself, it is enough to imagine the feature on its own and ask,
"Have I created a picture of a (useful part of a) useful article?" If so, the design is not
separable from the useful article. If not, it is.
Id. at 1033.
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Justice Breyer also cautioned that Varsity Brands "seeks to do
indirectly what it cannot do directly: bring along the design and cut of
the dresses by seeking to protect surface decorations whose 'treatment
and arrangement' are coextensive with that design and cut."6 2 In other
words, Varsity Brands was trying to use copyright to "prevent its
competitors from making useful three-dimensional cheerleader
uniforms by submitting plainly unoriginal chevrons and stripes as cut
and arranged on a useful article."63 Justice Breyer insisted that this
would be contrary to congressional intent and impermissible on the
correct reading of the majority's test.64
Justice Ginsburg concurred in the result but did not deem it
necessary to take up the question of the appropriate separability test
because "the designs at issue are not designs of useful articles.
Instead, the designs are themselves copyrightable pictorial or graphic
works reproduced on useful articles." 65
Because the Supreme Court had not addressed the overall
copyrightability and infringement issues in Star Athletica,66 the case
went back to the trial court. Recently, Star Athletica was dismissed in
accordance with the terms of a confidential settlement agreement
between Varsity Brands and Star Athletica's insurer.67  Star
Athletica's lawyers opposed the settlement and
objected-unavailingly-to the dismissal of the case. 68 The district
court's opinion offered no reasoning for the dismissal.
III. THE COURT'S ABOUT-FACE AND ITS DANGERS
The full meaning and consequences of Star Athletica are not
yet clear. It is possible to read the case narrowly, as a relatively
unimportant instance in which the Court simply "zoomed in"69 on the
PGS elements in the cheerleader uniforms and applied traditional law
62. Id. at 1036 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1033, 1035.
65. Id. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). For a
similar argument, see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 17.
66. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012 n.1 (majority opinion).
67. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-02508, 2017 WL 3446292, at
*1, *3, (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 10, 2017); see also Donahue, supra note 16.
68. Donahue, supra note 16.
69. In a very helpful analysis, Professors Kaminski and Rub recently identified a
persistent framing problem affecting virtually all aspects of judicial applications of copyright
doctrine. In doing so, they noted that courts virtually unconsciously toggle between zooming in or
zooming out in their applications of copyright principles. Margot E. Kaminski & Guy A. Rub,
Copyright's Framing Problem, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1102,1104-05, 1138-39 (2017).
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on the copyrightability of fabric designs. 70 If later courts interpret the
case as simply about the copyrightability of surface designs on fabric,
then Star Athletica is not likely to move the jurisprudential needle
very much. It is far more likely, however, that the case will be seen as
having made significant changes in copyright law by (1) rejecting prior
separability doctrine, and (2) offering its own new separability
standard.
The big dispute will be over whether these changes are
desirable or detrimental. Some observers might see Star Athletica as
providing a relatively benign resolution to a jurisprudential mess,
focusing as it should on art rather than function and leaving room for
other, better-situated copyright doctrines to guard against
overprotection. 71 For others taking the contrary view, Star Athletica
invites extensive overprotection of inseparable aesthetic elements and
extends de facto protection to useful articles for which no utility
patent would otherwise issue. 72 Whatever one thinks of the new
separability as applied in Star Athletica itself, however, one
70. Such a narrow interpretation of the meaning of Star Athletica would be consistent
with Justice Ginsburg's approach. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1018 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in the judgment). For a discussion of the copyright utility rule, see Pamela Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable
Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 729-36 (1984). See also Charles E. Colman, The History and Doctrine
of American Copyright Protection for Fashion Design: Managing Mazer, 7 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 150, 162-79 (2016) (describing protection for fabric designs).
71. For an article criticizing pre-Star Athletica separability jurisprudence and calling
for the useful articles doctrine to be seen as a device to channel the protection of functional ideas
from copyright to patent, see Shahshahani, supra note 5. Those who see Star Athletica this way
might believe that even if the textualist approach is imperfect, it has decided advantages-not
the least of which is the likely effect of reducing reliance on design patents. Scholars of design
patent have argued recently that judicial interpretations have overly expanded a protectionist
approach in design patent doctrine. For a view of design patent as reflecting the product
differentiation goals of sumptuary law rather than IP goals of promoting progress, see Barton
Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 862-64
(2010). For a wholesale critique of the current design patent system, see, for example, Mark P.
McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 31, 51 (2013) (arguing that unless design patent can be justified with respect to the
integration of aesthetics and function, there can be no sensible design patent system). As a
practical matter, the availability of copyright protection under Star Athletica could diminish the
role of increasingly protectionist design patent law in favor of more balanced copyright law.
72. For a critique of Star Athletica arguing that it invites overprotection and
undermines IP boundaries, see, for example, Mark P. McKenna, Knowing Separability When We
See It, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 127, 127, 131 (2017); Mark P. McKenna & Christopher Jon
Sprigman, What's In, and What's Out: How IP's Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J.L.
& TECH. 491, 493 (2017); Peter S. Menell & Daniel Yablon, Star Athletica's Fissure in the
Intellectual Property Functionality Landscape, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 139 (2017)
("Taken together, the majority and dissenting opinions threaten substantial harm to the
intellectual property system by recognizing protection for functionality outside of the strictures
of utility patent law.").
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fundamental problem with the Court's approach is that its clear
rejection of prior doctrine will leave courts with nothing to turn to
when faced with fact patterns that confound the Court's new test. By
contrast to the clarity of that aspect of the decision, the Star Athletica
Court adopted a supposedly simple, unified-but quite vague-test for
separability. Having taken away whatever clarity there was in the
jurisprudence, the new separability replaces it with uncertainty and
no guidance for subsequent courts.
A. Jettisoning Prior Separability Doctrine
Star Athletica altered the law in three ways: (1) by shifting the
focus of separability entirely to the extracted features of the useful
article, (2) by rejecting prior creator-focused and consumer-focused
conceptual separability tests, and (3) by expressly discarding the
physical-conceptual separability distinction.
First, the Court shifted the locus of separability analysis. The
Copyright Office and some scholars had evaluated conceptual
separability by assessing whether after separation the extracted PGS
elements would stand on their own as works of art and the useful
work would remain equally useful without those features. 73 The Star
Athletica majority explicitly rejected any assessment of the remaining
utility of the useful article; it chose instead to focus only on the
independent existence of the PGS features as works of art. 7 4 It
rejected the notion that the only protectable PGS elements should be
73. See, e.g., 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.5.3, at
109 (1989); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES §
924.2B (3d ed. 2014) [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2014 COMPENDIUM],
https://law.resource.org/pub/us/compendium/ch900.html#s924.2(B) [https://perma.cclG8G8-
H43N]; Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 12-13.
74. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013-14 (majority opinion). As the majority put it:
The focus of the separability inquiry is on the extracted feature and not on any
aspects of the useful article that remain after the imaginary extraction. The statute
does not require the decisionmaker to imagine a fully functioning useful article
without the artistic feature. Instead, it requires that the separated feature qualify as
a nonuseful pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own. . . . [T]he statute does
not require the imagined remainder to be a fully functioning useful article at all,
much less an equally useful one.
Id.
The majority was concerned about the arbitrariness of birth order in determining
separability, so it sought to "interpret] §§ 101 and 113 in a way that would afford copyright
protection to the statuette in Mazer regardless of whether it was first created as a standalone
sculptural work or as the base of the lamp." Id. at 1012; see also Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 36-37
(describing the formalism of the birth order paradox and suggesting a reverse § 113(a) approach
by which courts would ascertain separability "by inquiring whether the [relevant feature] could
be conceptualized as a preexisting PGS work reproduced 'in or on' a useful article").
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those that "play absolutely no role in an article's function[.]" 7 5 It also
reiterated, however, that copyright protection for separable PGS
elements does not provide a monopoly in the manufacture of the
underlying useful work and noted that separability is only one of the
hurdles a claimant would need to pass in order successfully to assert
infringement of a copyrighted work.76
Second, the Court explicitly rejected the two major approaches
to separability previously developed by the circuits. As described by
the appellate court in Star Athletica, separability analysis since Mazer
v. Stein generated many tests.7 7 Although they can be lumped in
various ways,7 8 one useful taxonomy could divide the predominant
pre-Star Athletica separability jurisprudence into consumer-oriented
tests and creator- or design process-oriented tests. 79  The Star
Athletica majority rejected both of those types of
75. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014 ("An artistic feature that would be eligible for
copyright protection on its own cannot lose that protection simply because it was first created as
a feature of the design of a useful article, even if it makes that article more useful. . . . Were we
to accept petitioner's argument that the only protectable features are those that play absolutely
no role in an article's function, we would effectively abrogate the rule of Mazer and read 'applied
art' out of the statute.").
76. The majority insisted that:
Of course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its own, the feature
cannot itself be a useful article or "[a]n article that is normally a part of a useful
article" (which is itself considered a useful article). Nor could someone claim a
copyright in a useful article merely by creating a replica of that article in some other
medium-for example, a cardboard model of a car. Although the replica could itself be
copyrightable, it would not give rise to any rights in the useful article that inspired it.
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)); see also id. at 1013 (explaining
that even if Varsity Brands had "a valid copyright in the surface decorations at issue here, [it]
ha[s] no right to prohibit any person from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of identical
shape, cut, and dimensions to the ones on which the decorations in this case appear").
77. Numerous separability tests can be teased out of the various circuits' cases on useful
works separability and commentary offered by scholars. See Ghosh, supra note 5, at 97 (listing
nine separability tests gleaned from cases and literature); Perlmutter, supra note 4, at 340-41.
The Sixth Circuit in Varsity Brands identified nine and added its own tenth. See Varsity Brands,
Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 484-85, 487 (6th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002
(2017).
78. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 5, at 97-100 (grouping nine identified separability tests
into three categories: (1) those requiring examination of the work, (2) those focusing on the
observer or audience of the work, and (3) those that focus on the creator's motivations).
79. This approach to categorizing pre-Star Athletica separability tests looks at the
vantage point from which the tests were to be applied. Some-the consumer-oriented
tests-principally focused on consumer reactions: What was the primary appeal of the work as
gleaned from customer use? Would the work be marketable even if it did not perform its
function? Others-particularly the creator-oriented separability tests-looked at the impact of
functional considerations on the design, seeking to determine whether artistic or functional
considerations influenced the choice of aesthetic features of a given useful item during the
creative process. See id. at 99.
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approaches-choosing to focus solely on the work itself.8 0 Thus, going
forward, the separability inquiry will not focus on whether the
aesthetic elements of a useful work constituted the primary appeal of
the object to purchasers, or would be marketable to consumers
regardless of function, or were dictated by functional considerations.
Finally, the Court also explicitly rejected the distinction
between physical and conceptual separability, adopting what it
described as a conceptual instead of a physically focused inquiry.8 1
The Court did not choose to limit the separability inquiry to physical
separability alone.
Admittedly, the cacophony of conceptual separability tests had
exasperated scholars and courts. 82 One response could have been to
limit copyrightability to physically separable PGS elements. In light
80. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. In his taxonomy, Professor Ghosh describes some
of the prior conceptual separability tests (such as the Copyright Office test, the
primary/subsidiary approach, the objective necessity approach, the stand-alone approach, and
the Patry dictated-by-function approach) as focusing on the work itself. See Ghosh, supra note 5,
at 97. In other interpretations, these tests could be sorted into the consumer-focused and creator-
focused categories, if interpreted broadly enough. See id.
81. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014. Although the majority's standard, as phrased,
would not necessarily foreclose a physical separability interpretation, the Court did not, in fact,
apply its new standard that way. A group of prominent IP law professors filed an amicus brief
(the "McKenna et al. Brief') in the case and offered a separability standard not very differently
expressed than that adopted by the Court. However, the amici saw their proposed test as one
that focused on physical separability, with conceptual separability described as a "coda" to
physical separability. See Brief for Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, 4, 8, 9-11, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)
(No. 15-866). The brief took the position that one must keep one's eye on Congress's intent to
distinguish between applied art and industrial design as the goal of the separability analysis and
that, therefore, the key distinction should be whether the artistic elements applied onto a useful
article would exist as copyrightable works on their own, even if the useful work into which they
were integrated was destroyed. Id. at 2. This seems very close to the separability test adopted by
the Court in Star Athletica. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. But the amici would interpret
it as a way to reduce the extent to which industrial design would be protected as applied art.
This is because the amici assumed that a replica of the overall shape of a useful article replicates
the article. See Brief for Intellectual Property Professors, supra, at 2, 14. This is also the
dissent's position in Star Athletica. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1030-36 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). But the majority and the dissent split over whether the attempt to apply the new
separability test necessarily ended up replicating the useful article. The majority focused on the
separability of the graphic elements within the outside frame of the uniform and found that
Varsity Brands did not replicate the uniform shape any more than a fresco on a ceiling replicates
the useful ceiling. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012 (majority opinion). The McKenna et al.
Brief asserts that under its proposed standard (which is close to the one that the majority
adopted), the aesthetic elements of the cheerleader uniform existed only as part of the uniform
because the coordination and arrangement of the common elements in the design constituted the
cut of the uniform. Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of Intellectual Property Professors in Support
of Petitioner, supra, at 3, 10, 17. But that is not how the majority saw it.
82. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 2; Perlmutter, supra note 4, at 339 and sources
cited therein.
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of the preference of modern design for seamless melding of form and
function, such an approach would likely have entailed much less
copyright protection for aesthetic elements integrated into useful
works. 83 Having rejected such an approach, however, the Court did
not pick among the alternatively available conceptual separability
tests-because it did not see them as properly grounded in the text of
the statute. 84  Instead, it chose a scorched-earth policy in their
regard.85 Thus, the Court's clean slate in Star Athletica has effectively
deprived subsequent courts of policy-based choices in assessing the
copyrightability of PGS elements in useful articles.86 They now have
83. See Alice Rawsthorn, The Demise of 'Form Follows Function', N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/01/arts/Oliht-DESIGN1.html [https://perma.cc/26C6-
SDPX].
84. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014-15. Other alternatives, such as Professor
Ginsburg's "reverse § 113(a)" approach were not addressed. See Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 37. On
that approach, even if a useful article's aesthetic feature could be conceptualized as a preexisting
PGS work reproduced in or on a useful article, the independent existence criterion would
preclude copyright for "aesthetically pleasing designs in which the form affects the function[.]"
Id. at 47. Even if the first prong of the Court's new test is consistent with the first part of the
Ginsburg approach, its decision not to look at whether the form affects the function is an implicit
rejection of the Ginsburg option.
85. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014-15. Despite their flaws, however, neither
branch of the prior conceptual separability doctrine was irrational. Many scholars simply argued
in support of consumers or creators as their preferred reference points (although more criticized
the creator-focused approaches). See Ghosh, supra note 5, at 93. Still others focused on the
evidentiary use of the various standards as proxies for the function of aesthetics in a given
article. For an article interpreting copyright doctrine through the lens of its evidentiary uses, see
Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683 (2003). Some, including
Professor Yen, argued that the apparent conflict among the circuits as to conceptual separability
resulted from judicial reliance on different-and incommensurable-theories of art. See Alfred C.
Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 247, 250 (1998); see also Robert
Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A
Community of Practice Standard, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 343, 347-49 (2015). This might have made
the Court wonder about the extent to which a unitary (but vague) test would simply replicate
those differences even if under a different name. The Court did not address the ways in which
methodologically oriented analyses might have helped rationalize the use of alternative
approaches to conceptual separability. For example, would greater self-consciousness about
zooming in and out in separability analysis have allowed courts focusing on consumers or
creators to discover the underlying normative goals they were trying to approximate with their
interpretive methodologies? Would that have dispensed with Star Athletica's scorched-earth
approach to alternative separability standards? See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1015.
86. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1015; see also Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc., No. 15-
CV-9597 (KBF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 138041, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (rejecting
defendant's argument because of the Star Athletica ruling). In an analysis of the issue after the
Court granted certiorari in Star Athletica but before it decided the case, Professor Ghosh
predicted that "[a] unified test ... is unlikely." Ghosh, supra note 5, at 91. Instead, he concluded,
"the Court might clarify the principles and policies lower courts should look to in resolving
specific disputes." Id. That is precisely what the Court's opinion in Star Athletica did not do.
That leaves one to wonder whether any of the available pre-Star Athletica separability
jurisprudence could deal better with the potential problems of aggregate anticompetitive effects
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nothing to rely on in such cases beyond the Court's abstract new
separability definition. This is likely to tilt courts toward
overprotection.
B. The Indeterminate New Separability Test
Having overturned prior law, the Court offered a conceptual
new test. That two-pronged inquiry in PGS cases involving useful
works is uncertain both in Star Athletica itself and as a guide in
future useful works cases.87 Each of the two prongs of the new test is
problematically indeterminate.
1. The Identification Prong
Without any explanation, the Court in Star Athletica found the
first prong of its analysis satisfied. This inquiry seems not to require
the identification of any kind of work of fine art; recognition of a PGS
element is enough.88 If that is enough, though, most attractive works
of industrial design these days will likely satisfy that identification
standard.89 The new identification step seems less like a hurdle than
a bump. What work does the first prong really do? 90 How many
of multiple copyright registrations over similar designs than does the new separability approach.
See discussion infra Part V.A.
87. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007; Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Clarifying the
"Clear Meaning" of Separability, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 79, 82 (2017) (criticizing the
opinion's lack of guidance for lower courts); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Sum Is More Public Domain
than Its Parts?: US Copyright Protection for Works of Applied Art Under Star Athletica's
Imagination Test, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 83, 83-84 (2017) ("While the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning and application of the 'separability' standard for decorative elements of the
kind at issue in that case, the decision leaves the knots as tangled as ever when a claim of
copyright concerns the entire form of a useful article.").
88. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007, 1012. "Work of art" seems like a high standard,
one that implicitly incorporates a high art originality component. But the Court did not define
the phrase "work of art," and in other parts of the opinion, the majority's language suggests a
much more prosaic inquiry. See id. For a history of the work of art standard under prior
copyright law, see Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 5-11. Despite the Court's own application of the
identification prong in Star Athletica, is it likely that some courts will address "what is art?" at
this point-the very question apparently ruled off-limits by Justice Holmes in Bleistein's famous
aesthetic nondiscrimination directive? See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 250-52 (1903). Those courts that acknowledge the need for a variety of aesthetic judgments
in copyright cases, despite Bleistein's warning, might especially find that inquiry
unexceptionable. How they interpret the first prong of the new test might depend on whether
they attend in isolation to what the Court said or what it did.
89. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 133 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As Justice Breyer in
dissent mused: "[V]irtually any industrial design can be thought of separately as a 'work of art':
Just imagine a frame surrounding the design, or its being placed in a gallery." Id.
90. The identification prong might also be considered irrelevant from the point of view of
those who believe that only purely expressive-and not in any way functional-PGS features
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designs incorporated in a useful object would not satisfy the first
prong?91
How the fact-finder is to "spot" the PGS work is not explained
in Star Athletica; the Court seems to assume that this kind of
envisioning is somehow natural and obvious. But the process of
envisioning is complex; it requires all sorts of choices as to starting
point, vantage point, and focus. Thus, might the level of specificity at
which a court envisions a design influence the outcome of this part of
the inquiry? And, at least in two-dimensional cases, will the exercise
of imagination plausibly lead to different results depending on how
closely one looks at the item? In the case of cheerleading uniforms, if
one zooms in on the prints, then it is easy to imagine that they are
akin to traditionally copyrightable fabric designs. If one zooms out
and looks at the whole item, then one might plausibly imagine the
overall shape in which the designs are embedded. The step of
determining whether the arrangement would qualify as a
two-dimensional work of art could be narrowly or broadly
interpreted. 92 Moreover, the identification of PGS elements requires
some degree of prior decision as to how to define the useful work in
which the PGS features inhere.
Additionally, a fundamental difficulty of the identification
prong of the test is that the starting point determines what one can
imagine. For example, with respect to the iconic Brandir bike rack,93
if it were not in use by bikes, it might well look like a curvy, albeit
basic, sculpture. On the other hand, in use as a bike rack, it cannot
help but look like a bike rack, and its separable PGS elements are
hard to imagine. This makes the first part of the standard far less
straightforward and determinate than the majority seems to wish.
Similarly, as Professor McKenna recently pointed out, the Star
Athletica "majority's formulation puts pressure on claiming in cases
should be copyrightable. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12,
at 121-22.
91. See McKenna, supra note 72, at 129-30 ("[I]n light of copyright's capacious
originality standard, any feature of a useful article, described with sufficient particularity, could
be 'imagined' as a separate work. . . . Like obscenity, the Court apparently just knows artistic
features when it sees them.").
92. So, on a narrow interpretation, copyright examiners and courts would have to ask
whether they could in their imaginations "see" an array of chevrons, color blocking, and stripes
that are not the same thing as the shape of the dress. If so, those features would be protectable
PGS elements. On a broader interpretation, the Copyright Office personnel and courts would
find separable PGS features if the aesthetic elements are either preexisting works of art or could
be rendered onto two-dimensional canvas or paper. See id.
93. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146 (2d Cir. 1987)
(exploring the copyrightability of the RIBBON bike rack).
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involving useful articles." 94  Although "it is hard to resist the
conclusion that" the majority's implicit acceptance of Varsity Brands'
designs "as surface ornamentation was dispositive[,]" 95 whether that
characterization was "the most natural one" depends on whether
courts focus on the images "in the deposit copies or on Varsity Brands'
characterizations of' those designs.96 "[T]he level of abstraction of the
description" of the designs is likely to influence the outcome of the
identification prong.97 Thus, in the absence of a "consistent claiming
methodology[,]" courts attempting to identify PGS elements will be
engaging in "artistic evaluation[,]" a "risky business" inconsistent with
the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle.98
Finally, the "imaginative" first prong (the identification
inquiry) leads to a procedural question as well: Who makes the
identification, and when? One of the things that complicates the
imaginative inquiry of prong one is the fact that the initial decision on
copyrightability is made by examiners in the Copyright Office at the
moment of registration. If courts defer to the Copyright Office's
registration decisions, then the first prong of the new standard will
nearly always lead to a finding of separability given the apparent
tendency of the Copyright Office examiners to err on the side of
registration. 99  If so, then the procedure will be outcome
determinative-and likely very copyright maximalist.
2. The Independent Existence Prong
The second prong of the new separability inquiry is ordinarily
more difficult to satisfy, as the Court acknowledges. 100  Yet the
majority blithely assumes its effectiveness despite the diametrically
contradictory results reached by the dissent in applying it in Star
Athletica itself. Unfortunately, rather than straightforward and
consistent application, the second prong of the test will likely lead to
inconsistent and contradictory results. One of the problems is that the
94. McKenna, supra note 72, at 131 ("The question of whether Varsity's designs
consisted of surface ornamentation (design on) or instead depicted the configuration of
cheerleading uniforms divided courts at every level of the litigation. Indeed, each of the three
opinions in the Supreme Court reflected a different understanding of Varsity's claimed design.").
95. Id. at 132.
96. Id. at 132, 135.
97. Id. at 135.
98. Id.
99. For a description of Copyright Office examiner practices and a recommendation that
the level of deference should be very low in the useful works context, see discussion infra Part
V.C.
100. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017).
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second prong is susceptible to both narrow and broad interpretations.
Unmoored by the Star Athletica majority and without the option to
pick among the pre-Star Athletica separability doctrines, courts will
apply the test either liberally or with constraint-depending on their
own unexamined methodologies and the stances from which they
choose to examine the matter. That unpredictability will prove
problematic not only for the development of copyright doctrine but
presumably also for practical issues such as litigation, licensing,
investment decisions, and innovation.
The second prong of the new separability test requires the fact-
finder to determine whether the identified PGS features could exist in
a fixed form either on their own or in another medium than the useful
article in which they appear. Does this simply ask whether the design
could be drawn separately on a piece of paper? 1 ' If so, virtually every
element of industrial design is equally capable of being drawn
separately from the useful work in which it appears. This would mean
that effectively all attractive graphic features gracing a utilitarian
object could be characterized as applied art and protected. That would
certainly blur the distinction Congress asserted as clear, and it would
dramatically expand the copyrightability of useful works with
attractive decorative features. Additionally, the Court specifically
rejected Varsity Brands' argument that two-dimensional works are
inherently nonuseful and therefore inherently separable.1 02
On an alternative interpretation, the second prong requires the
fact-finder to ask whether the PGS features, when drawn on a
separate piece of paper, necessarily replicate the useful work as a
whole. This second interpretation would make more sense but for one
thing: Elsewhere in the opinion, Justice Thomas asserts that birth
order should not affect the separability decision and argues that the
mere replication of the outer boundary of the useful item in a
separated drawing does not replicate the underlying useful work.1 03
As Justice Breyer points out, a drawing of the PGS features of Varsity
101. See Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 90-91 & n.198
(taking this interpretation, although noting a more charitable option as well, pursuant to which
"the Court may be asking if you could draw it on a sheet of paper and it would look not entirely
like the useful article as such, whatever that would be").
102. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1012 ("Just as two-dimensional fine art corresponds to
the shape of the canvas on which it is painted, two-dimensional applied art correlates to the
contours of the article on which it is applied.").
103. Id. In other words, Justice Thomas is concerned that it would be arbitrary to say
that a PGS work would be separable if it preexisted the useful item into which it was
incorporated but not separable if it were created as part of the useful article. Id. at 1010-11; see
also Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 37 (discussing the birth order point and suggesting that birth
order could be a distinguishing matter).
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Brands' designs as they are arrayed on the uniform will in many
instances replicate the outer outline or shape of the uniform design.1 0 4
Of course, whether and to what extent that will happen will depend on
whether (and to what degree) one zooms in or zooms out when
attempting to draw the PGS features.
The second prong is also confusingly phrased. It purports to
focus entirely on the aesthetic elements of the integrated work and
seeks to avoid assessment of the functional article. Indeed, it does not
prohibit copyrightability even when the aesthetic elements of the
useful object improve or enhance the function of the useful
article-and may therefore have a competitive influence in the market
for the useful work.105 As a result of this, in one reasonable reading,
the case opens the door to significant overprotection of functional
works. Nevertheless, despite the Court's insistence that the test
focuses only on the extracted design elements and not on the useful
article, it still requires an inquiry into whether the separable PGS
features are themselves useful articles or parts of useful articles.1 0 6
Taking that language seriously would imply that even separable PGS
features cannot be protected if, when separated, they are at least part
of a useful work-if, in other words, they have an intrinsic
nonexpressive and utilitarian purpose. 107  On this view, Star
104. Id. at 1035 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer seems to assume that the whole
shape of the uniform will inevitably be replicated by an independent drawing of the PGS design
features. See id. That is not necessarily true. For example, as the majority pointed out, the
designs had been reproduced by Varsity Brands not only on uniforms but on different kinds of
useful works (such as jackets). Id. at 1018 (majority opinion). Still, depending on how closely one
zooms in or zooms out, it is possible to imagine many instances in which the outer outline of the
useful work will come along with a drawing of the PGS features. Id. at 1033 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
105. For a critique on this ground, see, for example, Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting
Functionality, supra note 12, at 120; Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1314-15. Indeed,
the Court implicitly suggests that the reason for all the complexity and inconsistency in prior
separability tests was their focus either on the functional work's characteristics or its
relationship to the incorporated artistic features. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1009 (majority
opinion).
106. Id. at 1010 ("Of course, to qualify as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work on its
own, the feature cannot itself be a useful article or '[an article that is normally a part of a useful
article' (which is itself considered a useful article)." (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012))).
107. The second prong is also different from the statutory language. The majority says
that the second prong requires inquiring whether the PGS features can be "imagined apart from"
the useful article. Id. By contrast, the statutory language requires an assessment of whether the
PGS features are separable from "the utilitarian aspects of the article." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
The import of this difference is not clear, however. In one view, this difference is material
because the statutory language does not necessarily require a focus on the integrated useful
work. Professors Buccafusco and Fromer have argued that this difference reduces the burden on
the plaintiff. Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12, at 122 ("The Court's
misreading of the statute rendered the test substantially easier for plaintiffs to pass."). While the
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Athletica's second prong does require an inquiry into functionality and
the PGS elements' relationships to the useful article in which they are
incorporated.1 0 8 Thus, one way of reading the decision is that it
upends settled jurisprudence that hybrid features-what Professors
Buccafusco and Fromer have called "dual-nature" elements of useful
works 109-are not separable and therefore copyrightable. But to the
extent that the second prong of the Star Athletica test requires an
assessment that the PGS features are not themselves useful works,
the Court may not be announcing a particularly radical departure.
The real, underlying question, though, is how to define "function" for
purposes of determining whether the PGS elements are expressive or
have a hybrid, dual-nature character. Part VI below addresses the
failures of the Court's assumption that it does not have to offer a
theory of function. 110 First, however, let us imagine the consequences
of Star Athletica for future cases that present different kinds of
designs associated with useful works.
C. The New Separability in Application-Encouraging Opportunistic
Litigation
The abstract phrasing of the new separability test makes it
much less predictable when applied to useful works other than
two-dimensional fabric designs. Moreover, the degree to which the
new standard is likely to channel creativity toward some kinds of
works or aesthetic styles as opposed to others is also unpredictable."'
Testing the new Star Athletica standard against the facts of prior
iconic conceptual separability cases and the fashion protection cases
that are doubtless in the litigation pipeline suggests not only
argument is attractive, the characterization of the Court as having made a "mistake" depends on
an understanding of the statutory language that requires the separability inquiry to focus on the
useful work and on whether one can peel away nonuseful PGS features from the useful work
without affecting its function. But the Court is adopting a reading that seeks to focus on the
aesthetic elements themselves, and it is not clear that the quoted statutory language necessarily
prohibits that reading. The Court's statutory interpretation is subject to different critiques,
however, see infra Part IV, and there is language in the opinion that presumably constrains
plaintiffs when the aesthetic elements are themselves characterizable as useful works. See Star
Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
108. One could read this as requiring an inquiry into whether the extracted aesthetic
work has any new type of utility other than its utility when incorporated into the useful article.
However, this seems like much more of a stretch than interpreting the new standard as
requiring some kind of assessment of the functionality of the PGS features as incorporated in the
useful article.
109. Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 83-85.
110. See infra Part VI.
111. See infra note 128.
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foreseeable uncertainty and inconsistency in application 12 but also a
likely trend toward finding separability of PGS elements in more
circumstances than under pre-Star Athletica law. 113
1. A Thought Experiment Involving Fashion1 14
Fashion is an apt context in which to address future
application of the Star Athletica standard.1 15 The US fashion industry
112. Of course, one might ask whether the new unitary standard will necessarily lead to
more uncertainty than that which already exists as a result of the dueling circuit court
separability tests. Although this is of course an empirical question to which there is no answer in
the abstract, there are reasons to believe that the uncertainty would be greater. At a minimum,
the fact that there is supposedly one standard will drive contestation underground and make it
less easily identifiable. Moreover, some of the prior conceptual separability tests might have
better served to limit the effectiveness of aggregative copyright registration strategies than the
Star Athletica approach. See discussion infra Part V.
113. Recently, Professors Buccafusco and Fromer have argued that the Star Athletica
separability test does not respect the traditional analytic distinction between useful articles and
nonuseful articles. See Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12, at 119. In
their view, courts will now effectively grant copyright to useful articles. See id. Congress
specifically stated its intention that function not be copyrightable, reaffirming a long copyright
history reflected in such iconic cases as Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). See 17 U.S.C. § 102
(2012).
114. On some interpretations, the new separability test would change the results in some
of the iconic conceptual separability cases involving useful articles. Iconic separability cases have
addressed an aesthetically designed belt buckle, Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,
632 F.2d 989, 990 (2d Cir. 1980); a sculptural bike rack, Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac.
Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987); clothing display mannequins, Carol Barnhart,
Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1985); and the mannequin of a head for
makeup application, Pivot Point Int'l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 920 (7th Cir.
2004). In many, if not all, of these cases, reasonable viewers could disagree as to the new
seaparability test's results when applied.
For example, as noted above, the bike rack in Brandir could be seen as a basic, modernist
sinusoidal sculpture and therefore copyrightable (contrary to the result in Brandir itself). See
Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147-49. Or an alternative viewer could reasonably conclude (especially
when seeing the item in use) that it would be difficult to imagine separable, non-functional PGS
features because the entire shape would necessarily be replicated. See Buccafusco & Fromer,
Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 67 (asserting that the Brandir bike rack has an intrinsic
utilitarian function of holding bicycles securely). Similarly, those looking at the Kieselstein-Cord
belt buckles found to be copyrightable in the Second Circuit early on could come out either way
when applying the new separability test. See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 990. On the one hand,
a viewer could look at the swooping curves of the belt buckle and see in them a sweeping design
that could be reproduced in an artwork without the central pin designed to anchor the belt. See
id. at 995 (depicting the belt buckle). An alternate viewer, though, might look at the belt buckle
and have difficulty imagining the swooping curves as separate from their underlying
incorporated utilitarian design. See id. Depending on how broadly the test is applied, even the
anatomically accurate dress forms of Carol Barnhart could be considered separable. See Carol
Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 425 figs.1 & 2. Similarly, the "hungry look" of the makeup instruction
mannequin in Pivot Point could be imagined as a lifelike model sculpture-or not. See Pivot
Point, 372 F.3d at 915, 931.
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is a $370 billion enterprise involving 1.8 million jobs.116  The
availability of new copying technology has prompted the development
of a robust knockoff or copycat industry as well as literal copying of
trending fashion designs.117 Whether literally duplicating a design or
simply aping its style in a copycat or knockoff version, the parasitic
copying industry sells its designs at much lower cost than the original
designers. Despite recent assertions that the low-protection IP
environment for fashion has allowed the development of a rich and
innovative fashion industry,118 proponents of additional legal
protection for fashion designs have thus far (unsuccessfully) sought
115. For pre-Star Athletica discussions of copyrightability and fashion design, see, for
example, Colman, supra note 70; Giovanna Marchese, Note, A Tri-Partite Classification Scheme
to Clarify Conceptual Separability in the Context of Clothing Design, 38 CARDoZO L. REV. 375
(2016).
New technologies and new subjects and forms of form-function hybridity (including wearable
technology) are also likely to present new types of contexts in which to assess separability.
Beyond the context of fashion, there is some question as to whether Star Athletica will open
the door to enhanced copyright protection for attractive aspects of traditionally functional works.
So, for example, the Court made it clear that shovels as shovels would not warrant copyright
protection, even if they had separable and copyrightable sculptural aspects that would. Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1013 n.2 (2017). But what about the
shovel's aesthetically appealing, modernist shape that makes the shovel look sleek and
streamlined, but also simultaneously makes it function more smoothly or efficiently in use as a
shovel? Because of the vagueness and the particular two-dimensional context of the Star
Athletica test, the consequences for traditional utilitarian industrial design beyond fashion are
not clear either. See Jonathan E. Moskin, Commentary, C-O-P-Y-R-I-G-H-T: What Does That
Spell? Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands Reimagines Protection for Useful Articles, 107
TRADEMARK REP. 776, 777 (2017).
116. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1035 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (citing Brief for Council of
Fashion Designers of America, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3-4, Star
Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866)).
117. See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of
Fashion, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1171 (2009); Courtney Daniels, Note, Made in America: Is the
IDPPPA the Answer to the United States Fashion Industry's Quest for Design Protection?, 20 U.
MIAMi Bus. L. REV. 113, 126-27 (2011); Alexandra Manfredi, Note, Haute Copyright: Tailoring
Copyright Protection to High-Profile Fashion Designs, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 111,
117-22 (2012).
118. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1035 ("The fashion industry has thrived against this
backdrop."). Professors Raustiala and Sprigman have persuasively argued that "piracy is
paradoxically beneficial to the fashion industry" (even if that is not the case for individual
designers) because the pressure of copycat designs fuels trends and leads to quick innovation.
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Response, The Piracy Paradox Revisited, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 1201, 1203 (2009) [hereinafter Raustiala & Sprigman, Piracy Paradox Revisited]; see also
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1717-35 (2006) (arguing that design copying
contributes to induced obsolescence and helps anchor trends). But see Hemphill & Suk, supra
note 117, 1170-1184 (adopting a different approach to fashion trends and arguing that a degree
of copyright protection is helpful to emerging designers); Susan Scafidi, F.I.T.: Fashion as
Information Technology, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 69, 87-90 (2008).
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sui generis fashion IP.119 Although fabric designs have historically
been considered copyrightable, and although some elements of fashion
could achieve copyright protection 20 under prior separability
standards, it is likely that fashion lawyers will see Star Athletica's
standard as offering enhanced copyright protection for fashion.
Fashion lawyers have dismissed design patents as too expensive and
lengthy a process for realistic protection at a time of instantaneous
copying of fashion designs and have also doubted copyright's ability to
solve the problem of fashion copying under pre-Star Athletica
interpretations of the separability standards. 121  For them, Star
Athletica could be seen as a godsend. During oral argument in the
case, Justice Sotomayor suggested the conclusion that finding
separability there would "kill" the knockoff industry. 122 The majority
opinion did not even address that eventuality or whether such a result
would be a good or bad thing. Justice Breyer in dissent asserted that
"a decision by this Court to grant protection to the design of a garment
would grant the designer protection that Congress refused to provide
[and] would risk increased prices and unforeseeable disruption in the
clothing industry."123
Star Athletica does not necessarily dictate broad protection of
fashion design, of course. The Court's standard would not
automatically make any common combination of sewing elements
copyright eligible. Moreover, the analogy to cheerleading uniforms is
not apt enough to entail systematic overprotection on the analytic
grounds that led to the majority's result in Star Athletica.124  Still,
119. See, e.g., Dan Hunter & Suzannah Wood, The Laws of Design in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction, 37 ADELAIDE L. REV. 403, 406 & n.22 (2016); Raustiala & Sprigman,
Piracy Paradox Revisited, supra note 118, at 1204-06; see also Charles E. Colman, The History
and Principles of American Copyright Protection for Fashion Design: A Strange Centennial, 6
HARv. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 225, 226 (2015).
120. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2014 COMPENDIUM, supra note 73, §§ 924.3(A)(1)-(3).
121. See Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 107, 123, 148 (2016); Elizabeth
L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP's Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 317, 352 (2011); see also
Ralph D. Clifford & Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The Constitutionality of Design Patents, 14 CHI.-
KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 553, 591-92 (2015) ("[D]esign patents are cumbersome and expensive to
prosecute, a matter up front for patent attorneys and product experts.").
122. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1002 (No. 15-866), ("Justice Sotomayor: You're killing . . . knock-offs with . . .
copyright. You haven't been able to do it with trademark law. You haven't been able to do it with
patent designs. We are now going to use copyright law to kill the . . . knockoff industry. I don't
know that that's bad. I'm just saying.").
123. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1035 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
124. Fashion design is not really the same as cheerleading uniform design. Professors
Hemphill and Suk, although they are on the other side of that debate, describe the ways in which
fashion design enables individuals to simultaneously follow a trend and express their
individuality. Hemphill & Suk, supra note 117, at 1164-68. Uniform designs, however, are
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responses by lower courts are likely to vary. Some will doubtless read
the separability test to protect many more elements of industrial
design than would have been protected at least under some
separability tests heretofore. The new separability could reverse the
outcomes in some notable fashion cases. For example, the new
standard could open up the possibility of copyright protection for the
fabric draping of prom dresses found inseparable in cases like Jovani
Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc. 125 An examination of historic
red-carpet dresses also demonstrates the possibility of expanded
copyright protection. 126
different. They are designed to minimize the wearer's individuality and reflect a group aesthetic.
Each cheerleader is a representative-an agent-of the school for which she or he cheers.
Cheerleading uniforms, therefore, can benefit most not from change but from standardization
and continuity. That continuity and standardization permits the building and dissemination or
distribution of the school's brand over time. The school's identity is what is associated with the
uniforms.
125. Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542, 549-50
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). In Jovani Fashion, the court had found that the dresses were not protectable
because they served the function of enhancing the aesthetic appeal of the wearer. Id. at 550.
("Aesthetic appeal is a core purpose of a prom dress. Given the purpose of a prom dress, a design
element's decorative or aesthetic qualities will generally not suffice to trump its utilitarian
function of enhancing the wearer's attractiveness."); see also Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co.,
416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that creatively designed casino uniforms had no
conceptually separable elements that would be marketable as such). It is of course possible that
even courts concluding that the particular ruching or sequin arrangement of the prom dress
designs in cases like Jovani would satisfy the first prong of the Star Athletica test might find
that the second prong of the test is too high a hurdle. For a recent argument that the Court's new
test is unlikely to "make much of a difference" in most fashion cases but could change results in
some prior mannequin and three-dimensional article cases and generate an increase in product
shape copyright infringement claims, see David E. Shipley, All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and
Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the U.S. Supreme Court's Perceived and Imagined
Separately Test, 35 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3032666 [https://perma.cc/SU27-854S].
126. Although Bjork's iconic Oscars swan dress would likely have passed muster under
pre-Star Athletica separability jurisprudence, query whether the new separability test might
lead to protection of other dresses as well. See Linda Sharkey, Bjork's Infamous Swan Dress Now
Honoured at Moma Museum-Almost 15 Years Later, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 16, 2015, 12:45 PM),
http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/fashion/features/bjork-s-infamous-swan-dress-is-now-
honoured-at-moma-museum-almost- 15-years-later- 101 10915.html [https://perma.cc/6JPP-
ERZR]. Stella McCartney's Octavia dress, worn by Kate Winslet at a film festival in 2011 and
consisting of a trompe l'oeil hourglass figure design, might be copyrightable under the new
standards, while probably uncopyrightable under a Jovani approach. See Marchese, supra note
115, at 399-408. Critics argue that permitting McCartney to protect the Octavia design with
copyright would "monopolize all future dress designs that utilize colorblocking to slenderize the
wearer's form in the same way, which would greatly affect competition within the clothing
apparel market." Id. at 413. What about the beaded fringe in Emma Stone's Givenchy dress or
the chiffon design on the upper body and fringe at the calves in Halle Berry's Versace Oscars
gown? See Edward Barsamian, Halle Berry Shut Down the Oscars Red Carpet in Custom Atelier
Versace, VOGUE (Feb. 27, 2017, 4:30 AM), https://www.vogue.comlarticle/halle-berry-atelier-
versace-lindsay-flores-oscars-2017-celebrity-red-carpet-fashion-style [https://perma.cclBSE5-
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Realistically, it is likely that the ultimate impact of Star
Athletica in fashion litigation will be most evident in edge cases. But
this does not mean that it will not have a major economic impact on
the fashion world as a practical matter. The possibility of going to
court for copyright infringement under a malleable standard adopted
by a Court that rejects copyright policy as an interpretive tool means
that fashion designers will likely deter copycats much more easily
than heretofore. The degree of deterrence-or the extent of new
licensing markets-is unknown, of course. Uncertain as well are
speculations about which types of fashion designers and what sorts of
designs will engage in copy-deterring litigation. 127  There is a
significant amount of uncertainty about the potential impact of the
new separability test on designer incentives, and we should be careful
not to attribute too much directive effect to Star Athletica. Creativity
in design is likely to shift one way or the other for a variety of reasons,
including-but not likely centrally-in response to legal rules. At a
minimum, this is because Star Athletica does not articulate a principle
with inevitable certainty in application. Still, the adoption of the Star
Athletica standard will undoubtedly have an impact on the fashion
participants' bargaining positions and the configuration of the
industry.128
Whatever its benefits in its factual context, a deceptively
simple and uncertain unitary test creates incentives for opportunistic
litigation, which is likely to expand the doctrine's boundaries over
time. This push has already started in the fashion context with a
pending lawsuit by Puma against Forever 21 over Rihanna's footwear
designs. 129 The Puma case shows that what is at stake is not the
HZ5C]; Oscars 2017: The Best Dressed Celebrities on the Red Carpet, VOGUE (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.vogue.com/slideshow/oscars-2017-best-dressed-red-carpet-celebrity-fashion#5
[https://perma.ccl7SG6-YKAM].
127. Will it be the major fashion houses or the smaller, emergent designers who will
benefit from the Star Athletica approach? See Madison, supra note 14.
128. Another concern with the Court's new test goes to whether it will have sub-rosa
effects in channeling creativity in particular substantive directions in the types, genres, and
characteristics of design in integrated works that will be created in the future. For example, will
the possibility of copyright protection lead to less modernist and more baroque designs with more
easily imagined stand-alone PGS elements? Will it lead the major fashion houses to reduce their
reliance on logos and branding protected by trademark because they have a better protective
alternative? See Susan Scafidi, Intellectual Property and Fashion Design, in 1 INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH 115, 121 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2006) (arguing that the
availability of trademark protection for logos increased their use in design). To the extent that
fashion functioned with a low level of copyright protection until now, what impact will the
availability of some additional (though uncertain) level of copyright protection have on the
operations of the fashion industry? See Kaminski & Rub, supra note 69, at 1172-73.
129. See, e.g., Puma Files Suit Against Forever 21, supra note 15. Thus far, there are few
post-Star Athletica cases citing the Supreme Court's decision. But see, e.g., Design Ideas, Ltd. v.
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copyrightability of surrealist sculptural elements as in Elsa
Schiaparelli's iconic hats and dresses. 130 Rather, today's claims are
about bows or strips of fake fur applied to rubber slides. Whatever
happens in the Puma case, it opens the door for other litigation
pushing the doctrine to the extreme. When the separability test
skews so much toward the protection of a fashion item's aesthetic
features (regardless of their visual function), it changes the risk
calculation with respect to litigation in this context.131
Even if aggressive readings of the new separability test will not
inevitably lead to massive overprotection in application, there is the
concern about how courts will in fact apply the unitary test outside of
surface ornamentation contexts. All that is needed is a few courts to
apply the Star Athletica standard to expand protection for attractive
fashion or industrial design that would not have received copyright
protection under prior doctrine. If they do so at an early stage, those
decisions will potentially establish the outer-and more
expansive-protection boundaries as the new normal.
IV. STAR ATHLETICA'S SAVING STRATEGY-PUNTING TO COPYRIGHT'S
OTHER LIMITING PRINCIPLES
Before overreading Star Athletica and imagining its worst
possible consequences, however, it is important to remember that the
Court explicitly punted the ultimate questions about copyright
protection downstream to other copyright doctrines. The Star
Meijer, Inc., No. 15-cv-03093, 2017 WL 2662473, at *1 (C.D. Ill. June 20, 2017). In Design Ideas,
which involved the copyrightability of the Sparrow Clip (a clothespin with a silhouette bird
design at the top), the court affirmed the summary judgment it had previously granted the
plaintiff on the ground that the bird silhouette satisfied the Star Athletica standard for
copyrightability. Id. Responding to the defendant's argument that the bird silhouette itself had a
function because it could be hung from a rod or a string by its beak, the court asked "once the
bird portion is removed from the clothespin, what is the usefulness of hanging the bird from a
rod or hanging the bird on a string by its beak?" Id. at *3; see also Jetmax Ltd. v. Big Lots, Inc.,
No. 15-cv-9597 (KBF), 2017 WL 3726756, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (finding that the
decorative metal covers of decorative tear drop light sets satisfied Star Athletica's separate
identification and independent existence requirements as sculptural works); Triang1 Grp. Ltd. v.
Jiangmen City Xinhui Dist. Lingzhi Garment Co., No. 16 Civ. 1498 (PGG), 2017 WL 2831025, at
*1 (S.D.N.Y June 22, 2017) (finding decorative black trim shaped like a "T' on bikinis to be
copyrightable).
130. See Elsa Schiaparelli: Fashion Meets Surrealism, ZOOWITHOUTANIMALS, (May 14,
2013), https://zoowithoutanimals.com/2013/05/14/elsa-schiaparelli-fashion-meets-surrealism/
[https://perma.c/C75W-FBAB]. For some images of fashion designer Elsa Schiaparelli's
surrealist clothing, see id.
131. See Vishwanath Kootala Mohan, Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands: SCOTUS Cheers
for Broader Copyright Protection, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., July 2017, at 36, 40; Moskin, supra
note 115, 786.
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Athletica Court made clear that it was not ruling on the originality of
the Varsity Brands designs but only on their separability. 132 This
indicates that the majority did not see itself as simply
rubber-stamping a separability end run in order to invite a century of
protection for banal functional articles. Query then whether copyright
doctrines beyond separability serve to discipline the potential negative
consequences of the Court's new separability test. Copyright policy
strongly supports the proposition that copyright's limiting doctrines
should be read to limit expansive protection of aesthetically designed
functional works such as cheerleading uniforms. 133 But guideposts for
how to do that are not provided in Star Athletica.
A. Exclusion Doctrines
A variety of limiting approaches are possible. 134 Originality
could be interpreted more strictly in the context of useful works with
aesthetic features. The exclusion doctrines of merger and scenes &
faire as well as the prohibition on copyright protection for "idea[s],
procedure[s], process[es], system[s], method[s] of operation, concept[s],
principle[s], or discover[ies]"1 35 could conceivably help stave off
132. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 n.1 (2017).
133. Legislative history indicates Congress's desire to keep even beautiful industrial
design out of the realm of copyright. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668; see also McKenna, supra note 72, at 128 (arguing that the
Court in Star Athletica lost sight of the channeling function of the useful article doctrine).
134. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 5; cf. Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 12, at 1296
(identifying filtering, exclusion, and threshold functionality screens used in IP doctrines); see also
Pamela Samuelson, Functional Compilations, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 321, 324-26 (2016) (arguing that
functionality does and should limit the copyrightability of compilations and that courts have
used limiting doctrines such as those described in this Part to achieve that result).
There are also remedy-focused avenues potentially available as a guard against
overprotection of function post-Star Athletica. A flexible approach that would reduce the
issuance of injunctions in hybrid useful works cases might be fruitful. See Peter Lee & Madhavi
Sunder, The Law of Look and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 585, 588-89 (2017) (suggesting that
courts should not grant injunctions against competitors who use stock designs and should
apportion damages); see also Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract
Failures in Copyright Law, 29 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2 (2011) (counseling flexibility as to
remedy). In fact, since the Supreme Court affirmed that the traditional four-part test should
apply to the issuance of injunctions in patent cases in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006), the issuance of injunctions in IP cases has slowed. See H. Tomis
G6mez-Arostegui, Prospective Compensation in Lieu of a Final Injunction in Patent and
Copyright Cases, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1661, 1663, 1677 (2010) (noting this development but
arguing that courts' substitution of prospective compensation for post-judgment copyright
infringements in place of injunctions is not legislatively authorized); Christopher B. Seaman,
Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV.
1949, 1952-53 (2016). Further elaboration of the remedy question is beyond the scope of this
Article.
135. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
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negative effects of overprotection in the separability context. Scope
doctrines such as thin copyright-common in the compilation
context-could step in as well. Filtering methodology used in
assessing substantial similarity for infringement purposes in some
functional contexts-such as computer software-would be easily
adaptable to PGS elements in useful works. It is also worth exploring
whether an enriched doctrine of copyright abuse or misuse could
better address the anticompetitive concerns discussed above. 136
Finally, there is also the procedural issue of the level of deference
courts should pay to Copyright Office registration decisions in the
useful works context. 137
1. Originality
Copyright only attaches to "original works of authorship."3
The Star Athletica majority specifically reminded us that its opinion
did not address whether Varsity Brands' designs should be considered
sufficiently original to be copyrightable. 139  The first question is
whether copyright's requirement of originality would limit copyright
protection for functional items. Will lower courts apply originality
standards more restrictively in order to avoid overprotection of PGS
elements in useful articles?
The key issue will be whether courts will grant protection for
original combinations of uncopyrightable visual elements for these
kinds of common geometric shapes and color combinations. One could
argue that Varsity Brands' designs should not be deemed to contain
sufficient originality because they consist of common geometric shapes
and colors traditionally considered uncopyrightable. On the other
hand, the Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural
Telephone Service Co. established a low standard of originality, at
least in the context of factual compilations. 1 40 Although Feist requires
some "creative spark," compilations of very banal material were
subsequently deemed to satisfy Feist's requirements. 14 1  Query
136. See supra text accompanying note 21 and infra Part V.B.
137. See discussion infra Part V.C.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
139. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 n.1 (2017) ("We
do not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable. We express no opinion on
whether these works are sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection, or on whether
any other prerequisite of a valid copyright has been satisfied." (citation omitted)).
140. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
141. Id. at 345. In Feist, the Supreme Court chose to reject the "sweat of the brow"
doctrine and to assert the need for some level of creativity as a constitutional requirement. Id. at
359-60. Feist required some "creative spark[,]" but noted that "the requisite level of creativity is
extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice." Id. at 345, 359, 363. The Court did not find
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whether the degree of creative spark in the cheerleader designs
exceeds those precedents. There seems to be an implicit conflict
between the views of the dissent and the concurrence as to this point,
so the answer is unclear. The dissent confidently asserts that the
Varsity Brands designs at issue would clearly be unoriginal. 142 Yet
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence responds to the dissent's assertion as
to the lack of copyright originality in Varsity Brands' designs by
reminding the Court of the low level of originality required for
protection under Feist.143
One possible argument for Star Athletica on originality would
focus not on the creativity element of the requirement but on its
origination aspect. Copyright will attach to works that owe their
origin to the author and not to facts, discoveries, systems, or other
things that do not trace their origins back to the author. 144 Thus, the
argument would go, those aspects of Varsity Brands' designs that are
dictated by the function of achieving optical illusions should not be
considered elements that owe their origins to Varsity Brands. If the
placement of triangles at the waist makes the wearer look like she has
a thin waist and this audience perception results from something that
does not owe its genesis to the author, then arguably it should not be
considered sufficiently original-especially given the basic, building-
block aspect of the visual elements. In other words, the designs are
not original because they are dictated by function. Or in yet other
words, is the work expressed "in the only way it can be expressed,
where the choice is imposed on the author by necessity, not by any act
of creativity"14 5 -as the result of determined causality? If designs are
dictated by their biological effects on observers, should they be
thought of as closer to discovered facts than authored works? In such
circumstances, the features are arguably discovered, as are facts,
rather than owing their existence to the author as originator. This
enough in the white pages at issue in Feist itself, largely because they were compilations of facts
with commonplace arrangements (and perhaps because of their genesis in a state law
requirement-not to mention their functionality). Id. at 362-63. By contrast, some post-Feist
courts found yellow pages directories to be copyrightable as compilations. See, e.g., Key Publ'ns,
Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., 45 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding copyrightable
plaintiffs classified business directory for New York's Chinatown).
142. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1036 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (characterizing the design
elements as "plainly unoriginal").
143. Id. at 1018 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
144. See 17 U.S.C § 102 (2012); Feist, 499 U.S. at 347.
145. Dan L. Burk, Method and Madness in Copyright, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 613 (2007)
(emphasis added).
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shifts the functionality issue from the separability context to the
originality context. 146
2. Merger, Scenes et Faire, and the Prohibition on Copyright for
Systems
Even if the designs are deemed sufficiently original not to be
excluded for that reason, a variety of exclusion doctrines might
provide overlapping techniques for limiting copyrightability of
aesthetic elements in useful works. Scenes & faire doctrine, although
variously articulated, deprives copyright protection from those
"incidents, characters or settings which are . . . indispensable, or at
least standard, in the treatment of a given topic." 147 It places in the
public domain "elements that are 'necessary' for expression, and
necessity is defined by social practice." 148 Under the merger doctrine,
copyright protection is unavailable for expression when there are only
one or a few ways of expressing an idea. 149 Also, Section 102(b) of the
146. Cf. Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 45 (2007) (addressing human-created facts and how merger doctrine
should be amended to avoid rendering them uncopyrightable). There are, of course, significant
drawbacks to this. For an elaboration of some constraints on the application of copyright's other
limiting doctrines to useful works contexts, see infra Part TV.C.
147. Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also Leslie A. Kurtz,
Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 FLA. L. REV. 79, 79-82 (1989) (describing history).
Some of the other descriptions appear to narrow the scope of the doctrine beyond the breadth
assumed in the above-quoted text. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 19, at 794 (describing the
doctrine as one that denies copyright protection to "common elements of work that are essential
to the presentation of the subject matter of a work"). Whatever the specific definition, the scenes
& faire doctrine "relegates items to the public domain as they become stock and standard
infrastructure." Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 39,
58-62 (2008).
148. Lee, supra note 147, at 84. The doctrine "recognizes that" however it starts,
"expression[] can become basic infrastructure" and therefore shift into the public domain. Id. at
83.
149. Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 417, 417 (2016) (stating that under the merger doctrine, copyright will not protect
the expression of an idea when "that idea is incapable of being expressed, as a practical matter,
in more than one or a small number of ways"); see also Burk, supra note 145, at 589. Professor
Samuelson's survey of merger cases revealed that "[mlerger of idea and expression is usually
found when courts become convinced that both the plaintiff and the defendant had few
expressive alternatives when developing the works at issue." Samuelson, supra, at 442. This can
happen not only when the author of the first work has limited alternatives but also when her
design choices thereafter constrained the expression available to the defendant. Id. at 443.
Although merger and scenes & faire have similarities and sometimes overlap, Professor
Samuelson has explained their fundamental difference. Id. at 447-48 ("With merger, the core
issue is whether there are, practically speaking, more than a few alternative ways to express
particular ideas or functions. The core issue in scenes A faire cases, by contrast, is whether
certain elements in common between two works are indispensable in works of that kind, common
in the industry, or otherwise to be expected in works of that kind.").
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Copyright Act affirms the consistent doctrine since Baker v. Selden 50
that systems, processes, and methods of operation are excluded from
copyright. 151
There are good arguments for why these doctrines could serve
to police against overexpansion of protection in PGS-in-useful-works
contexts. For example, Professor Samuelson has recently catalogued
the merger doctrine in operation in copyright and argued that the
doctrine serves as an important limiting principle in US copyright
law. 15 2  She found that merger defenses "met with considerable
success in functional work cases." 15 3 Her study led to the conclusion
that the doctrine applies to copyrightability as well as scope, 154 and
she urged courts not to construe the doctrine too narrowly. Professor
Burk has similarly characterized separability in the useful article
doctrine as "a type of merger rule for functionality." 15 5 Merger might
be particularly apt in circumstances-such as that in Star Athletica
itself-in which one competitor has obtained so many copyright
registrations covering a particular kind of style that very few other
ways to express the idea are left for others to employ. Merger's goal of
promoting meaningful competition makes it an appropriate tool in the
useful works context. 156
Similarly, scenes t faire doctrine could well apply when
particular kinds of simple visual designs have become standard
elements inevitably expected by the audience in a particular context.
Alternatively, if defendants in particular cases are persuasively
able to argue that the elements at issue constitute a process, system,
or method of operation, Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act can serve
to limit their copyrightability. 15 7 Indeed, the prohibition of copyright
for systems and "processes is intimately bound up with the prohibition
on copyright for functional or useful articles."15 8 If, for example, the
goal of the particular placement of visual elements on a garment is to
150. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1879).
151. See Pamela Samuelson, Why Copyright Law Excludes Systems and Processes from
the Scope of Its Protection, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1921-23 (2007).
152. Samuelson, supra note 149, at 418, 467.
153. Id. at 428; see also id. at 419 n.11, 438-42 (showing in caselaw that "idea/expression
merger is not the only kind of merger").
154. Id. at 437-38.
155. Burk, supra note 145, at 591. Indeed, Professor Burk suggests that "[tihe constraint
on alternatives signals the presence of functionality." Id.; see also Pamela Samuelson, Strategies
for Discerning the Boundaries of Copyright and Patent Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493,
1524 n.175 (2017). For a reading of the merger doctrine that finds it at least partly motivated by
evidentiary concerns, see Lichtman, supra note 85, at 737.
156. See Samuelson, supra note 149, at 459-61.
157. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
158. Burk, supra note 145, at 592.
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achieve a particular visual effect determined by scientifically defined
optical illusions, then one might reasonably call that a process.
B. Infringement Doctrines-Thin Copyright and Filtration
If an infringement claim has not failed at the copyrightability
or limiting doctrine stage, copyright's infringement doctrines could
also be useful in deterring overprotection. For example, assuming
that the PGS designs in a useful work have sufficient creative spark to
be considered minimally original, it is still possible that-as in many
functional compilation contexts-courts would grant them merely thin
copyright protection. This would limit possible findings of
infringement even if the defendant's works looked similar. In the
context of copyrighted factual compilations, for example, the owner of
the copyright is deemed to have thin protection; another use of the
underlying facts, but not their exact compilation, will not lead to
liability for infringement. 1 5 9 This essentially limits the derivative
rights of the owner of a copyright in the compilation of facts. In cases
like Star Athletica, where the plaintiff was effectively seeking
copyright for compilations of otherwise basic and common shapes and
lines-and where it had registered multiple copyrights for designs
covering the field of such shapes in the cheer context160-a finding of
thin copyright protection could well have let Star Athletica off the
hook for infringement. 161 This is because most courts interpret the
infringement standard in thin copyright cases as virtual identity.162
159. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991). The Court in
Feist explained that
facts themselves do not become original through association. ... he copyright in a
factual compilation is thin. Notwithstanding a valid copyright, a subsequent compiler
remains free to use the facts contained in another's publication to aid in preparing a
competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection
and arrangement.
Id.
160. See discussion infra Part V.
161. See Samuelson, supra note 134, at 330-31 (noting that compilations have only a thin
scope of protection and that arguments based on similarities in the look and feel of a
second-comer's compilation are likely to fail).
Of course, Varsity Brands would argue that it was not simply compiling preexisting obvious
and basic shapes but was exercising aesthetic discretion in placing surface designs in particular
fashions. For a similar difference in opinion on the degree of originality in photographs, compare
Terry S. Kogan, How Photographs Infringe, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 353, 399 (2017), with
Justin Hughes, The Photographer's Copyright-Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 339, 342 (2012).
162. For a critique of this understanding of thin copyright, see 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY,
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 9:95 (2017).
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Moreover, particularly in certain contexts, courts will assess
similarity between the plaintiffs and defendant's works after filtering
out public domain elements. In infringement analysis involving
functional compilations such as software programs, for example,
standard elements or elements required by the technology or the
market are often filtered out in the assessment of substantial
similarity.163 Admittedly, courts in non-functional works contexts
have refused to filter out uncopyrightable elements and have sought to
protect even the overall look and feel of the works at issue. 164 But in
expressive works that are fundamentally functional, the functionality
has led courts to adopt filtering infringement analyses.165 Such
filtering-based substantial similarity assessments would be
particularly apt in useful works separability cases.
C. Constraints
Of course, questions remain both as to the application of such
doctrines and as to selections among them. Each of the doctrines has
its own limits. There are existing tensions and inconsistencies within
the limiting doctrines themselves. Addressing those in turn requires
normative judgments about what does and does not fit. Yet another
challenge is the need to compare the various safety nets and calibrate
them. Are there reasons to prefer one or another of these approaches
in attempts to limit the potential consequences of the new
separability? Do different limiting doctrines do better work in
different sorts of useful works contexts? They may not all be equally
advisable in every context involving aesthetic elements associated
with useful works. 166 How and on what basis should courts choose the
relevant limiting doctrines?
163. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992);
see also Samuelson, supra note 134, at 350; Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1215, 1220 (2016). For a view that the process of filtration is similar to the separability
analysis, see Ghosh, supra note 5, at 98.
164. See, e.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
1970); see also Lee & Sunder, supra note 134, at 532.
165. See, e.g., Altai, 982 F.2d at 706-12 (articulating an "abstraction-filtration-
comparison" test for software infringement cases).
166. Samuelson, supra note 151, at 1924, 1976 (recognizing the need to assess
comparative doctrinal fit when explaining that even if merger and scenes e faire could be
stretched to justify excluding copyright in particular contexts of functional expression, the
prohibition of copyright for systems, processes, and methods of operation might be a better and
more direct doctrinal route).
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These doctrines will not necessarily be applied to forestall
overprotection. 167 The argument as to lack of originality is probably
the least likely to succeed given the low threshold required for
originality. There are significant drawbacks to the origination
argument, however, not the least of which is that it has no natural
stopping point. This can be seen most clearly in the more extreme
version of the argument: the claim here would be that courts should
find a failure of origination when aesthetic elements are wholly
dictated psychological characteristics of the audience or even cultural
imperatives. This would be quite a stretch of the originality
doctrine. 168
As for the merger doctrine, its applicability depends on how
broadly or narrowly a court defines the idea or function and its
possible expressive alternatives. 1 6 9 Once the doctrine is expanded
beyond circumstances in which there is only one way to express an
idea, a normative theory is needed to choose when there are too few
expressive options to justify enclosing them in a property regime.
Some merger cases explicitly avow that applying the doctrine depends
on underlying policy decisions. 170 In addition, as Professor Ginsburg
has recently pointed out, the separability threshold "will in most cases
set a higher bar than the idea/expression 'merger' doctrine."171
Similarly, scenes & faire doctrine depends on prior assessments
of what makes something so stock or so standard that its ownership
should not be granted to one author. Where in the line between
abstract description and fully realized individuation do we draw the
line as to standardized building blocks? Moreover, some courts use
the merger and scenes & faire doctrines in determining
copyrightability, whereas other courts conceive of them as defenses to
167. See Samuelson, supra note 149, at 446-47. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
address the question of copyright doctrine overlaps more generally. Professor Samuelson's study
of merger indicates that "[clourts sometimes perceive the other doctrines as overlapping with
merger, but in some cases, courts invoke multiple doctrines when seemingly unsure which
doctrine would provide the soundest grounding for the court's decision." Id.
168. For an argument that "a definitive account of originality as a legal construct is not
possible," see Eva Subotnick, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and Creativity,
76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2011).
169. See Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 890 ("The merger doctrine itself is hardly a model
of precision."). The framing of the idea or function will determine the outcome. See id. at 890-91.
170. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
According to Professor Samuelson's extensive study of merger cases, Morrissey has been "widely
followed in subsequent case law." Samuelson, supra note 149, at 427.
171. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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infringement claims.1 72 Consider also whether critiques of attempts to
apply core copyright doctrines developed in literary contexts to visual
works would also apply here. 173
As for Section 102(b), because the Copyright Act does not
define the terms of the exclusion, much will depend on whether and
how a court defines the useful article's PGS elements. For example,
some courts might deem it too far a stretch of the Section 102(b)
exclusion to conclude that designs that seek to affect audience
perception by taking advantage of optical illusions should be
considered systems, processes, or methods of operation precluded from
copyright for Baker v. Selden reasons. 174
With respect to the infringement doctrines, although thin
copyright and the use of a filtering approach to similarity would be
helpful to limit infringement findings in useful works cases, the
prospect of a lengthy and expensive infringement trial would surely
have a chilling effect on potential defendants. So the major question
here is whether courts would be disposed to grant summary judgment
for defendants on infringement grounds before requiring the expense
and uncertainty of a trial on infringement.
In addition, choices among these possible saving doctrines
cannot be made acontextually or in the abstract. Obviously, the facts
will matter. Even so, the distinctions will not be inevitable. In the
cheer uniform context, for example, might the merger doctrine be a
better fit than scenes & faire because there are only so many ways to
make cheerleader uniforms that take advantage of perceptual tricks?
Or is scenes et faire a more useful doctrine once a certain style of
uniform has come to be expected by the audience?17 5
The Star Athletica Court's apparently insouciant belief that
any problems caused by its separability approach could easily be fixed
elsewhere in the IP regime does not look hard enough at the question.
172. See Kogan, supra note 161, at 379 & nn.126-29; see also Samuelson, supra note 149,
at 435-38 (citing cases in which merger was a copyrightability issue and not just an
infringement defense).
173. See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 161, at 356, 388-89 & nn. 172-84 (citing judicial and
scholarly doubts that core copyright doctrines such as the idea-expression dichotomy, scenes
faire doctrine, and merger fit when applied to visual works).
174. See Samuelson, supra note 151, at 1976 ("Without a richer conception of what
§ 102(b) excludes from copyright protection and why such exclusions are sound, there is a serious
risk that courts will construe the scope of copyright too broadly . ); see also Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
175. Samuelson argues that there are ways to channel different cases to merger or scenes
& faire: "Merger is the more appropriate doctrine to apply when design choices are 'dictated by'
. . . external factors. Scenes A faire is the doctrine that is most appropriate when common
element similarities are to be expected in works of that kind." Samuelson, supra note 149, at 450.
Where Star Athletica's facts fit in that characterization is not clear, however.
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It would not be paranoid to be concerned that the judicial and
legislative expansion of copyright protection in recent years on many
fronts would suggest only equivocal interest in robust interpretations
of copyright limits. Specifically, there are two competing doctrinal
principles tending toward overprotection despite the limiting theories
explored above: the judicial protection of total concept and feel,176 and
the availability of robust and expanding derivative works rights.177 In
practice, these doctrines can, in combination, lead to copyright
protection of the underlying useful works through the device of
protecting their incorporated PGS features. That is precisely what
both the majority and the dissent disclaimed doing, and what Section
113 of the Copyright Act addresses,178 but the majority's insensitivity
to the ways in which separability analysis relates to the rest of
copyright's doctrines invites such end runs.
In sum, a granular approach to assessing the practical
usefulness of these saving doctrines will be necessary after the "new
separability." But what doctrines lower courts should interpret in
ways that promote the best aspects of Star Athletica's separability
analysis while avoiding its greatest dangers is likely to be a
complicated question in practice.
V. STAR ATHLETICA'S LEAST EVIDENT PERIL: THE MULTIPLE
REGISTRATION PROBLEM
Even if the new Star Athletica standard would be reasonable in
application to many individual PGS features applied to useful articles,
and even if copyright's other limiting doctrines could successfully
winnow out the most unoriginal of those designs, Star Athletica
presents a deeper problem. Both the new separability test and
copyright's other limiting doctrines will be applied to determine the
copyrightability of individual designs in infringement cases.
Regardless of how reasonably the new separability test will be applied
176. For a critique of copyrightability based on total concept and feel, see, for example,
Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright
in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel, 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 397-98 (1989).
177. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2012). This adaptation right, as defined, is extremely broad:
"A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation,
musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording,
art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast,
transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
178. Id. § 113(a) ("Subject to the provisions of subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the
exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work in copies under
section 106 includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any kind of article, whether useful
or otherwise."); see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 &
n.1; id. at 1036 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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in such future cases, and regardless of how well copyright's other
limiting doctrines will be deployed to ward off overprotection in
individual instances, the less visible but more challenging threat is
now posed by strategies-like that of Varsity Brands' 79-to register
hundreds of variations in types of designs. At least in some markets,
the aggregate effect of all those registrations may be to exhaust the
design alternatives available to competitors in the manufacture of the
useful works in which the designs are incorporated.1 0  Such
anticompetitive strategies are contrary to the congressional goal of
using copyright to protect only applied art. Were copyright to protect
industrial designs, no matter how attractive, Congress worried that
competition in the markets for the useful works themselves could be
diminished.
A. Competition and Aggregate Anticompetitive Effects
Scholars have identified one policy underlying the functionality
doctrines in IP as the need to protect the domain of utility patent and
to ensure that copyright not be used to obtain backdoor utility patents
without patent examination.'18  Yet another policy possibility
179. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007 (majority opinion) (noting that Varsity Brands had
"obtained or acquired more than 200 U.S. copyright registrations for two-dimensional designs
appearing on the surface of their uniforms and other garments.").
180. Cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
77 (2005) (arguing that the value of patents today lies not in individual patents, but in "their
aggregation into a collection of related patents-a patent portfolio"). Parchomovsky and Wagner
explain that such patent portfolios give the holder the dual benefits of the right to exclude and
the bounded diversity of the individual patents in the portfolio. Id. at 31. They also note that
tailoring antitrust law might help "to curb the potential anticompetitive effects" on small firms of
large patent portfolios held by large businesses. Id. at 71-72.
181. See, e.g., McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 72, at 492-93. "[E]very other area of IP
understands its own domain to some extent in negative relation to utility patent." Id. at 492.
Otherwise, a useful work could have used its aesthetics to achieve over a hundred years of
protection (instead of the far shorter protections under utility or design patent law) without
having to go through any rigorous and substantive examination of its
non-obviousness and novelty. Separability doctrine in copyright, then, can be interpreted as a
channeling doctrine designed to shunt useful works toward utility patent and art toward
copyright. See, e.g., id. at 492, 494, 498; Moffat, supra note 22, 1474-75; Samuelson, supra note
155, 1494-96 (addressing the ways courts have dealt with the copyright-utility patent overlap
problem). Without that, overlapping IP protections could all too easily undermine the patent
bargain adopted in the public interest.
Critics of Star Athletica worry that a separability standard focused on the integrity of PGS
elements regardless of their contribution to the useful work's function will inevitably lead to
material amounts of overprotection under copyright law and overblurring of the boundaries
between copyright and patent. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12,
at 89 ("Granting copyright protection to these designs would enable Varsity to monopolize
functional aspects of garments without satisfying the exacting demands of patent law.");
Buccafusco & Lemley, supra note 12, 1295. On a critical view, because the Court focuses only on
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applicable to PGS elements of useful articles is the Congressional
concern about competition in the market for consumer goods and
useful articles offers. 182 One way to phrase the competition question is
to ask whether competitors would be unable to compete fairly in the
market for the underlying useful article if they could not use its PGS
elements. Another is to ask whether the plaintiffs market dominance
or its IP strategy would create material competitive barriers.
The Court in Star Athletica did not make anything out of the
fact that Varsity Brands had registered two hundred designs
representing variations on the theme of lines, zigzags, and chevrons as
designs for cheerleader uniforms. When should a court conclude that
the aggregate effect of multiple copyright registrations could
undermine Congress's procompetitive rationale for prohibiting
the aesthetic elements and attempting to imagine them on their own, and does not address how
those features-if they actually enhance the function of the underlying useful article-become
functional as a result of their integration into the functional object, it misses what Congress was
actually trying to do by insisting on the separation of applied art and industrial design.
To be sure, the channeling approach depends on each overlapping protective regime having a
clear understanding of the domain of utility patents. See McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 72,
at 494 ("Lack of a clear sense of utility patent law's boundaries undermines the very idea of
channeling."). It has been criticized for a narrow interpretation of the scope of utility patent as
focused on technological utility. Id. at 499. Moreover, the rationales for channeling are not
necessarily the same with respect to all aspects of IP. In other words, if the worry is about
avoiding the use of copyright to give useful works backdoor utility patents for the useful articles
themselves-giving copyright to a beautiful shovel whose engineering does not deserve patent
protection-how are courts to deal with the design patent regime? Are the bases for channeling
between copyright and utility patent the same as the bases for channeling between copyright and
design patent? The Court in Star Athletica reaffirmed that both protective regimes could be
available for the same PGS work. Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1015.
Even with respect to utility patents, when will aesthetics perform certain kinds of functions
that pose a significant threat of backdoor patents? Presumably, the backdoor patent problem
arises if the design is necessary to the function and, therefore, using the design monopolizes the
function even if the function could not properly have been granted utility patent protection.
Justice Thomas might ask, "Why would giving copyright protection to separable PGS elements of
useful works necessarily end up according patent-like protections to the useful work without the
benefits of patent examination?" Both the Copyright Act and the Supreme Court clearly state
that allowing copyright for separable PGS features of aesthetic articles does not bring along with
it a copyright in the underlying, unseparated utility. 17 U.S.C. § 101; see Star Athletica, 137 S.
Ct. at 1010. In Star Athletica itself, both the majority and the dissent fully agreed that
considering a car model separably copyrightable would in no way grant the owner of that
copyright a right to monopolize the manufacture of the underlying useful article-the car. It
would only guard against reproduction of the design elements onto the car. Id. at 1010; id. at
1030 (Breyer, J., dissenting). So the intuition must be that sometimes, the integrated aesthetic
elements will inevitably bring the useful work itself into the copyright fold. Even though that
would not always be the case, the policy of policing the boundaries of the various IP regimes is a
useful reminder to check.
182. Market dominance could lead to the predictable harms of monopoly in pricing and
availability and, at a minimum, require competitors to engage in unnecessary variations in order
to compete.
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copyright in useful articles? In oral argument in Star Athletica,
Justice Sotomayor asked whether protection would ensure that
schools are "stuck with you [Varsity Brands] being their only supplier
of their school colors for the rest of their existence." 183 This issue too
was not mentioned in the final opinion. Should it have been?
When a particular aesthetic style-particularly one that
combines basic building block visual elements-has become associated
with a particular product and manufacturer, and that style has come
to be expected by the audience, then protecting the style by copyright
can effectively give the manufacturer a monopoly in the manufacture
of the items bearing the style. In such circumstances, by monopolizing
the visual standards (whether it generated them or simply identified
and deployed them),18 4 one participant can create significant barriers
to competitive entry and deter beneficial innovation.18 5 Even if that
has been allowed in the copyright context via the protection of authors'
styles,186 it is more dangerous in the context of some kind of useful
works because copyright of style in certain types of contexts and
industries brings with it the protection of the underlying functional
work. Indeed, the hybrid expressive elements may themselves be
functional-if function is defined broadly to include affecting
particular ways in which the user is perceived.1 87 Restricting access to
aesthetic features can sometimes inflict competitive harm.1 88  In
industries and contexts where standardization is common or useful,
one participant can monopolize the standards (whether it generated
183. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 122, at 33; see also id. at 32 ("Does the
university that contracts with you know that they have to buy their uniform . . . from you for 99
years plus whatever? Every university that you sell these cheerleading uniforms to, do they
know that under your copyright, they are stuck with you forever?").
184. On the relevance of the plaintiffs own activities in the trademark context, see Justin
Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227,
1230 (2015) (recommending that aesthetic functionality only be found by courts in trademark
cases "when the product feature at issue triggers a positive cognitive, psychological, or aesthetic
response among a substantial composite of the relevant consumers and that response predates
the trademark owner's activities").
185. See Lee & Sunder, supra note 134, at 532 (arguing that even though design law
should protect elements of look and feel, it should remain cognizant of the ways in which
"expansive intellectual property protection of design . . . can in fact erode innovation,
competition, and culture itself').
186. Id. at 539-40 (describing the sometimes-expansive protection of total concept and
feel in copyright and citing to relevant authority).
187. For this argument in the garment context, see Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's
Function, supra note 12, at 52-53.
188. Mark P. McKenna, (Dys)functionality, 48 Hous. L. REV. 823, 847 (2011); see
McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 71, at 25.
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them or simply identified and deployed them) and create barriers to
entry and beneficial innovation. 189
The problem is that an acontextual, bright-line rule excluding
copyright because of the inseparability of PGS features would
overread the constraints on market entry in such circumstances.
Where there are true network effects (such as in the classic case of
telephony), or standardization is driven in large part by transactions
and switching costs (as with computer software), 190 this kind of
argument is very persuasive. Similarly, if audience or user
expectations are clearly set for external reasons-cultural, religious,
technological, or otherwise-and clearly hard to change, then it is
reasonable to worry about the extent to which new entrants could
realistically compete if they did not have permission to use what is
competitively necessary. 191 If, on the other hand, standardization is
not fundamentally necessary and switching costs are low, then this
argument for inseparability and exclusion is not persuasive.
Customer expectations are changeable and people switch for reasons
of cost and convenience in. many circumstances.
It is worth trying to apply this notion to the uniform designs in
Star Athletica itself because the facts invite competing narratives on
the issue. 192 On the one hand, Varsity Brands' aggregative copyright
189. Computer software is the paradigmatic example of an industry exhibiting network
effects and switching costs. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 163, at 1237, 1284; see also Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819-20 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring)
(noting, in a case involving a claim of copyright in a computer program's menu command
hierarchy, that the difficulty of switching from one program to another for users who have made
an investment in learning the prior program and developed their own macros for it can pose a
"concern with fencing off access to the commons in an acute form"), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
190. See Lotus, 49 F.3d at 810; see also Burk, supra note 145, at 591 (describing Lotus as
an example of "functionality merger" because of standardization and switching costs);
Samuelson, supra note 149, at 466.
191. The much-criticized aesthetic functionality doctrine in trademark law, see Hughes,
supra note 184, at 1229 and sources cited therein, appears to be motivated by the same sort of
competition-protecting concern. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995)
("The functionality doctrine . . . protects competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to
recognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely, their
inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features."). The
typical non-reputation-related disadvantage has been described as a situation in which the
product features in question amount to a "competitive need" with less favorable alternative
options. Id. at 166; see also Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 96;
McKenna, supra note 188, 829-30; McKenna & Strandburg, supra note 71 at 25,.
192. Was Star Athletica a plucky new entrant trying to break the market leader's
arbitrary and excessive pricing in the public interest? Or was it the poster child for infringers,
helmed by a former employee of Varsity Brands determined to crush and replace its competitor
by an offensive use of copyright-limiting doctrines? Conversely, was Varsity Brands a rapacious
monopolist which bought out all its competitors, achieved market power in a multimillion-dollar
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strategy could capture virtually all geometrically shaped and optical
illusion-laden designs and diminish (if not eliminate) competitors'
ability to use similar basic geometric and color forms in their
uniforms. Competitors would have to come up with significantly
different types of looks and shift the standardized aesthetic character
expected by sports audiences. Such a result would seem directly
contrary to congressional intent.
On the other hand, the cheerleading uniform market may be
quite different from the computer software market with respect to
network effects and high switching costs. 1 93 There is nothing that
requires cheerleading to be exclusively identified by the Varsity
Brands kind of uniform design style. Assuming schools or
cheerleaders buy cheerleading uniforms yearly, the switching costs
are likely to be minimal. Indeed, there may be reputational
advantages to a school donning uniforms markedly distinguishable by
factors other than the school colors themselves. Moreover, history
reflects that over the years, cheerleader uniforms have changed (and
at one point had no ornamentation or design other than the reference
to the relevant school). 194 Still, it is possible that the cultural
expectations of cheerleading today firmly reflect certain sorts of
appearance requirements that can only be achieved by the use of
certain kinds of visual tricks. And it is also possible that, cognitively
and perceptually, there are a limited number of ways to achieve these
visual effects. Under such circumstances of constraint and aesthetic
scarcity, giving copyright protection to the underlying elements
necessary to achieve those visual tricks could make it very difficult (if
not impossible) for new entrants to compete. Obviously, a number of
contestable assumptions underlie that conclusion. In addition to the
gendered and mutable character of claims about appearance
expectations, one might wonder at how firmly fixed in stone they are.
Similarly, one might question the precise degree to which ways to
achieve particular visual effects are truly limited.
This is not to weigh in on one side or the other in the particular
context of cheerleading uniforms. It is, rather, to suggest that when
the justification for rejecting copyright protection for otherwise
copyrightable PGS features is based on concerns about competition
policy, the wisest course would not be blanket exclusion in the
market, and sought to use copyright law to enforce its monopoly? Or was it a copyright owner
properly fighting against in-your-face IP theft?
193. See supra notes 189-90 and sources cited therein.
194. See, e.g., Jessica, The Evolution of Cheerleading Uniforms, OMNI CHEER (Apr. 19,
2011), http://www.omnicheer.com/blog/post/the-evolution-of-cheerleading-uniforms
[https://perma.cc/5XWY-QWZ9] (describing the uniforms' evolution).
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abstract. Instead, a richly contextual account would be more likely to
reveal the right balance in any given case. The question, then, should
be whether the party seeking copyright protection in its PGS elements
is actually deterring competition by monopolizing the look and feel of
the relevant context. A case-by-case approach, with showings of
actual anticompetitive effects and possible deployment of copyright
misuse-type rules-rather than blanket exclusions assuming
anticompetitive market harm-would be more likely to bear fruit.
Ultimately, even with respect to concerns about anticompetitive uses
of copyright to enhance market power in commodity markets, the most
practical approach would be to call for granular, fact-specific inquiries
into the impact of copyright protection on competition in cases
involving separability questions. Such individualized, industry-by-
industry inquiry was wholly missing from Star Athletica.
B. Framing Aggregative Registration Strategies as Copyright Abuse?1 95
One way to address the threat of aggregate harm from use of
multiple copyright registrations for similar designs on useful articles
is with a theory of copyright abuse. But what should count as "abuse"
of copyright? The Copyright Act is silent on the issue. 196
There is an existing judge-made doctrine of copyright misuse
parallel to patent misuse and already recognized in numerous
jurisdictions. 197 Could this be the appropriate vehicle to discipline
aggregative registration strategies in useful works contexts?
Copyright misuse is an equitable doctrine under which defendants can
avoid infringement by pointing away from their own behavior to the
inequitable conduct of the copyright owners. 198  However, "much
uncertainty engulfs the 'misuse of copyright' defense[;]" 199 it is not
195. I use the term "abuse," rather than "misuse," because the specific type of copyright
owner behavior addressed here has not, to my knowledge, been addressed explicitly in cases
referring to the existing copyright misuse doctrine.
196. John T. Cross & Peter K. Yu, Competition Law and Copyright Misuse, 56 DRAKE L.
REV. 427, 455 (2008).
197. See, e.g., Haris Apostopoulos, The Copyright Misuse Doctrine on Computer Software:
A Redundant Doctrine of U.S. Copyright Law or a Necessary Addition to E. U. Copyright Law?, 24
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 571, 572-73 (2006); Neal Hartzog, Gaining Momentum: A
Review of Recent Developments Surrounding the Expansion of the Copyright Misuse Doctrine and
Analysis of the Doctrine in Its Current Form, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 373, 378-99
(2004).
198. Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 90, 91
(2007).
199. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1990).
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fully developed and has been criticized for lacking coherence. 200 The
doctrine's rationale and scope are contested. Should the scope be
coextensive with antitrust, or should it apply in contexts in which
antitrust law would not find any cognizable competitive harm? 201 If
simply duplicative of antitrust, why is the doctrine even necessary?
Even if the doctrine has a rational basis in the patent context in which
it was born, does it have a rationale in the copyright area?
Further, the existing copyright misuse doctrine does not seem
to have yet been applied in hybrid useful works contexts where an
aggregative copyright strategy is used to constrain competition.
Should it be considered copyright misuse to use the copyright
registration process for anticompetitive purposes in product markets?
The argument would be that copyright misuse claims should lie when
what would in each individual instance constitute technically proper
uses of copyright registration in fact end up, in the aggregate, posing
threats to copyright policy and the balance of the copyright system.
When the aggregate registration strategy can effectively lead to
granting copyright to functional innovations, copyright misuse may
well be an appropriate judicial safeguard. 202 Under this kind of
approach, a court might find copyright misuse even if the conduct
200. Among schlarship addressing copyright misuse and taking contrasting positions on
its standards, see, for example, 1 HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 3.04 (3d ed. 2016);
Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 489-506 (2011); Thomas F.
Cotter, Misuse, 44 Hous. L. REV. 901, 925-26 (2007); Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The
Evolving Common Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 865, 868-871
(2000); Laura A. Heymann, Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights
Versus Selection of Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239, 269-70 (2013); see also Samuelson,
supra note 149, at 454-55 (noting that judicial reference in merger cases to concerns about
unwarranted monopolies suggests some degree of overlap between merger and copyright misuse,
although the merger cases in the study did not rely explicitly on misuse).
201. See Bohannan, supra note 200, at 476-77 (describing misuse as a "schizophrenic
doctrine that vacillates between IP and antitrust law"); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 200,
at 881 (describing two strands-public policy and antitrust-of copyright misuse circuit court
jurisprudence). For an argument rejecting antitrust as a basis for copyright misuse, see, for
example, David S. Olsen, First Amendment Based Copyright Misuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
537, 540 (2010) (arguing for the application of copyright misuse doctrine to uses of copyright
designed to censor others' speech).
The prime example of the public policy approach is Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978 ("[While it is
true that the attempted use of a copyright to violate antitrust law probably would give rise to a
misuse of copyright defense, the converse is not necessarily true-a misuse need not be a
violation of antitrust law in order to comprise an equitable defense to an infringement action.
The question is not whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law
(such as whether the licensing agreement is 'reasonable'), but whether the copyright is being
used in a manner violative of the public policy embodied in the grant of a copyright.").
202. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 200, at 912 (discussing the analogous context
of software).
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would not clearly constitute violation of the antitrust laws. It would
be enough to show interference with values of the IP system itself
(including competition) or undermining channeling between the
domains of copyright and patent. 203 The question, of course, is how
broadly to read those supra-antitrust and IP system goals. One
possibility is a misuse claim for "any act by which a copyright owner
attempts to expand its rights beyond the limits imposed by the
Copyright Act should constitute misuse."204  But this covers a
potentially expansive category of conduct, and cautious scholars warn
that although there is a place for copyright misuse doctrine,
"assertions of misuse should be . . . rare."20 5
Even if copyright misuse is expanded to cover aggregate effects
of multiple copyright registrations in designs of useful articles, a
theory of scope and limits will still be required. What kinds of
competitive harms posed by the plaintiffs uses of the copyright
registration system should be sufficient to trigger misuse claims?
How many registrations should be deemed to trigger concern? At
203. See Bohannan, supra note 200, at 478 (arguing that copyright misuse should reach
practices that undermine IP policies of encouraging innovation, promoting competition, and
encouraging public access, regardless of whether such practices would violate antitrust law);
Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 200, at 920-21 (focusing on the channeling issues at the
copyright-patent interface); see also Cross & Yu, supra note 196, at 457 (noting that even if a
copyright owner's activities might also satisfy antitrust law requirements, the behavior is
considered copyright misuse if it is deemed an attempt to evade copyright policy).
Lasercomb might be seen as an analogy, though not a perfect one, to the useful works
context. There, a copyright owner licensed its software, but its license contract prohibited the
licensee from participating in any way in the development Qf any software that would compete
with the licensor's software. Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978. Despite the res ipsa infringement
revealed by the facts, the Lasercomb court found the plaintiff culpable under misuse doctrine and
did not allow the plaintiff to prevail. Id. at 979. The copyright misuse resulted from the fact that
the license agreement "essentially attempts to suppress any attempt by the licensee to
independently implement the idea which [the licensor's program] expresses." Id. at 978. The
licensor abused its rights by "attempting to use its copyright in a manner adverse to the public
policy embodied in copyright law." Id. The Lasercomb court found the plaintiff at fault because it
was attempting "to control competition in an area outside the copyright, i.e., the idea of
computer-assisted die manufacture," by using contract to evade the idea-expression dichotomy
central to the overall copyright scheme. Id. at 979.
204. Cross & Yu, supra note 196, at 457; see also Cotter, supra note 200, at 963
(suggesting that the trigger for copyright misuse should be whether the conduct broadens the
scope of the grant of copyright); Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 200, at 889 (identifying
misuse violating the public policy behind the IP grant as one, non-antitrust basis for per se
copyright misuse rules). For those who are concerned about the potential breadth of the policy-
based copyright misuse doctrine, an alternative that looks more directly at IP policy itself
inquires whether "the IP holder engages in a practice that forecloses competition, future
innovation, or access to the public domain." Bohannan, supra note 200, at 478. While Bohannan
claims these policies as IP policies, regardless of their role in antitrust, her examples do not
reach the type of conduct at issue in Star Athletica.
205. Cotter, supra note 200, at 903.
758
2018] THE NEW SEPARABILITY 759
what point will a copyright registrant be deemed to have effectively
monopolized a style? According to what methodology does one
determine whether the copyright owner's registration practices have
tipped the balance toward misuse? The current doctrine has not yet
addressed this issue.
It is also important to remember that copyright misuse is an
equitable defense available on a case-by-case basis to defendants
whose behavior should get a "pass" because the plaintiffs behavior
abused the IP privilege. 206 Therefore, its applicability will be case
specific. For example, as noted above, a copyright misuse argument
could come out either way as applied to the facts of Star Athletica
itself.207
206. See Frischmann & Moylan, supra note 200, at 867; Hartzog, supra note 197, at 378.
207. As noted above, see supra notes 190-94 and accompanying text, a copyright abuse
claim would first focus on the fact that Varsity Brands had obtained copyright registrations in
hundreds of cheerleader uniforms with slight variations of chevrons, color blocking, and lines.
Brief for Petitioner at 15, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017)
(No. 15-866). Assuming that, as the preeminent manufacturer of cheer gear, Varsity Brands had
established-or at least refined and reinforced-the particular look and feel of its geometrically
designed uniforms as the standard in the field, see id. at 12-13, Varsity Brands' aggregate
registration strategy would make it very difficult for other entrants like Star Athletica to
compete with the same type of standardized uniform. Thus, the argument would conclude,
Varsity Brands' tactic of locking up all the uniform designs that are effectively standard to and
expected by all participants should be seen as a way of foreclosing competition in the designs of
the underlying functional articles. This should be considered copyright misuse, on this argument,
because the recognition of aesthetically separable elements would be used to monopolize
competition in the manufacture of the underlying useful works, which copyright explicitly is not
supposed to protect.
One of the problems with this argument, though, is that-unlike computer software-the
standardization in designs of athletic uniforms is probably easily changeable. See Frischmann &
Moylan, supra note 200, at 917-18 (discussing the standardization engendered by network
effects with respect to software). To the extent that manufacturers like Varsity Brands charge
high prices for cheer gear because of their dominant market positions, schools might be willing to
change to a different kind of design for their uniforms if the alternatives were economical
enough. Granted, there would be a transition period, and schools might have to replace all their
uniforms if they wanted to switch to a different design style, but whether that would be a
problem depends more on pricing than on copyright doctrine. The question of when and how to
define standardization that effectively ties users' hands and grants the owner of the
copyrightable work monopoly power is much easier in the context of computer works and other
works whose use requires user investment. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d
807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring), aff'd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233
(1996) (describing switching costs when users have invested in learning as a particularly acute
threat to public access to knowledge). The extent to which that is true in contexts like
cheerleader uniforms is unclear. The question, then, would be whether Varsity Brands'
aggregative registration strategy should be considered to be like the abusive license provisions
attempting to evade the idea-expression distinction, or simply appropriate uses of their rights to
copyright individual works under the Copyright Act and to engage in the perfectly appropriate
business activity of branding. This is a harder question than that posed by the license provisions
in Lasercomb. See supra note 203; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Make Me Walk, Make Me Talk, Do
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Perhaps one way of addressing the issue is to ground the abuse
argument not on the underlying IP policy but on the degree to which it
invites and supports litigation abuse, that is, "overly aggressive
assertions of IP rights which otherwise threaten to discourage lawful
conduct[.]" 208  Copyright registrations that cover most plausible
combinations of basic visual forms could constitute a first step in a
hyperaggressive copyright litigation strategy likely to have significant
chilling effect on competitors.
Whether styled as an expanded type of copyright misuse or a
species of litigation abuse, however, a doctrine of copyright abuse
addressing aggregative registration strategies in useful works
contexts cannot function as a general rule. Therefore, both its
application and its chilling impact are much harder to calibrate than
copyright's exclusion doctrines discussed above. Still, despite the need
for a clearer doctrinal footprint based on a well-articulated normative
ground, the notion of copyright abuse offers courts a useful lens
through which to assess anticompetitive effects of aggregative
copyright registration strategies such as those employed by Varsity
Brands.
C. The Administrative Alternative-What Deference Should Be Due to
the Copyright Office's Registration Decisions?
Another way in which Star Athletica's potentially negative
consequences could theoretically be averted is procedural and
administrative. Under Section 410 of the Copyright Act, the
Copyright Office is tasked with examining applications for registration
and accepting or rejecting them. 209 However, relying on the Copyright
Office to control the effects of aggregate copyright registration
strategies would not work. The problem is that, at least as a practical
matter, the Copyright Office faces too many barriers to accomplish
such a task. In fact, the realities of the Copyright Office's procedures
should dispose courts not to grant much weight to certificates of
registration granted to PGS features of useful articles.
Whatever You Please: Barbie and Exceptions, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE
CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP 405, 405 (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014)
(noting that as creative material becomes branded, trademark can provide copyright owners
"potentially perpetual rights," just as copyright can help trademark owners to avoid limits
applicable to commercial transactions).
208. Cotter, supra note 200, at 962; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright
Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1273 (2008) (discussing fair use as a response to
copyright overclaiming); Ghosh, supra note 5, at 98 (mentioning how separability tests can be
used to engage in anticompetitive litigation).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 410(a)-(b) (2012).
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The Supreme Court did not grant certiorari on the question of
deference to the Copyright Office. 210  The Sixth Circuit in Star
Athletica held that decisions of the Copyright Office with respect to
registration deserved Skidmore deference, with deference depending
on the agency's thoroughness in consideration, validity of reasoning,
consistency with prior decisions, and persuasiveness. 211 Using that
standard, the appellate court found that the district court had erred in
"failing to give greater deference to the Copyright Office's"
registrations of the Varsity Brands designs. 212 The Sixth Circuit
rested its deferential approach on the Copyright Office's consistency in
registering Varsity Brands' other similar designs, its attempt to
ground its decision on the statutory text with "sound legal
reasoning,"213 and on the observation that the Office's "expertise in
identifying and thinking about the difference between art and function
surpasses ours." 214  Although the court reiterated that the
presumption of validity attaching to registration was rebuttable, its
language indicated that it saw the defendant's burden as high indeed.
Its rationale for deference was grounded on the thinnest of reeds and a
less-than-zero examination of the Copyright Office's review process. It
made no mention of the fact that the Copyright Office does not
ordinarily provide reasoning or explanations for its decisions to issue a
registration certificate, although such reasoning will ordinarily
accompany registration rejections.215
The history of how the Copyright Office has handled the
registration of PGS elements of useful articles is an instructive
response to the Sixth Circuit's assumption of consistency. Although
the Office gives its examiners guidance (inter alia, through internal
documents such as the Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office
Practices),216 the examiners are not required to be attorneys, 217 artists,
210. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
211. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2015),
aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) ("We ... hold that the Copyright Office's determination that a design
is protectable under the Copyright Act is entitled to Skidmore deference. Individual decisions
about the copyrightability of a work are not like 'rules carrying the force of law,' which command
Chevron deference."); see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) (adopting a
multifactor test).
212. Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 480.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Robert Kasunic, Copyright from Inside the Box: A View from the U.S. Copyright
Office, 39 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 323 (2016).
216. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES (3d ed.
2017), https://www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium-draft.pdf [https://perma.cclW7HW-
863C] [hereinafter U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2017 COMPENDIUM]; see also Varsity Brands, 799
F.3d at 480 (discussing the Compendium).
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or art historians and do not need to coordinate with any other
administrative agencies outside of the Copyright Office in the exercise
of their duties. At the point of registration, the Copyright Office
examiners
don't have the benefit of factual arguments, cross-examination, discovery, market
effects, expert witnesses, or other evidence that may affect a court's determination.
The registration process simply examines the claim and the deposit and seeks to
ensure that the legal and formal requirements of a claim in copyright are met in
accordance with our longstanding institutional expertise in these questions. 2 18
There is also no indication that the Copyright Office examiners
routinely look to see whether a registrant's other copyright
registrations appear to be capturing a particular style or look based on
the combination of basic visual elements. 219 Even with respect to
individual registrations of PGS elements in useful articles, the history
of the Copyright Office is in fact inconsistent.220  Although the
Mazer-era history suggests that the Copyright Office was hesitant to
register functional works, recent history indicates that Copyright
Office examiners have adopted a presumption of registrability for
aesthetic elements of such works. 221 The Copyright Office practice of
217. Currently, all examiners are required to take "the equivalent of a complete law
school copyright course as a refresher to ensure that everyone understands the concepts of
copyright law." Kasunic, supra note 215, at 323.
218. Kasunic, supra note 215, at 318.
219. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2017 COMPENDIUM, supra note 216, § 602.4(D) ("The U.S.
Copyright Office generally does not compare deposit copy(ies) to determine whether the work for
which registration is sought is substantially similar to another work."). Indeed, it would be hard
for the Copyright Office to give examiners guidance on how and when to identify such a threat
and on how to decide when such a tipping point had been reached. Kasunic, supra note 215, at
322-23 (explaining the strain on copyright examiners).
220. See Colman, supra note 70, at 152-198 (explaining the history of the Copyright
Office's interpretation of "useful article" in the fashion design context). Not that courts have
fared much better, however. See id. at 194-97 (providing examples of courts having difficulty
with the meaning of "utilitarian"). In any event, it is because the Sixth Circuit only looked at the
registration decisions regarding all the rest of Varsity Brands' similar cheerleading designs that
it could conclude that the Copyright Office's registration decisions were consistent. Varsity
Brands, 799 F.3d at 480.
221. Colman, supra note 70, at 152. Associate Register Robert Kasunic admitted that "[i]n
the past, the Copyright Office had a culture that we give the benefit of the doubt to the applicant,
thereby defaulting to registration rather than refusal. Looking at this more, there is a persuasive
case to be made to default in the opposite direction." Kasunic, supra note 215, at 321. But cf.
Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 14-16 (noting that the Copyright Office did refuse to register a
significant number of applications for useful articles). Many of those refusals may have been due
to decisions on the part of Copyright Office personnel that the registration sought copyright for
the overall shape or configuration of the articles, which the Office traditionally rejected. Id. at
16.
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registering copyrights on a "Rule of Doubt" basiS 2 2 2 as well as the
routine of negotiating with applicants on registration suggests a skew
toward liberal registration. 223 There is no process of internal review at
the Copyright Office to discipline examiners "when the Office issues a
certificate of registration in close-calls[.]"1224 Under these
circumstances and in light of the congressional intent to limit the
copyrightability of aesthetic elements of useful works, there is little
reason for the courts to defer to Copyright Office registrations on
separability. 22 5
How Copyright Office examiners will apply the Star Athletica
test in the future is unclear. The pending revision draft of the
Compendium of U.S. Copyright Office Practices indicates that the
office is developing "updated guidance on the registration" of PGS
222. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2017 COMPENDIUM, supra note 216, § 607
(describing the Rule of Doubt). Under the Rule of Doubt, "the Office may register a claim to
copyright, even though the Office has reasonable doubt as to whether the material submitted for
registration constitutes copyrightable subject matter or whether the other legal and formal
requirements of the statute have been met." Id. Although the Compendium asserts that
registration will not be granted on the basis of the Rule of Doubt "simply because there is some
uncertainty as to how that issue may be decided by a particular court," and although it is unclear
whether and to what extent the Copyright Office has granted Rule of Doubt registrations to PGS
features incorporated in useful works, the fact that the Office has such a practice should cut
against automatic, knee-jerk deference to the Office's registration decisions without further
inquiry into the administrative process. Id.
223. Indeed, in the Star Athletica case itself, the Copyright Office had engaged in
correspondence with respect to some of Varsity Brands' registration applications. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 207, at 15. Star Athletica's brief and its brief in support of its petition for
certiorari report that the Copyright Office had originally rejected many of Varsity Brands'
cheerleading uniform designs. Id.; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 34, at 13-14.
224. Kasunic, supra note 215, at 322 ("At present with the existing level of staffing of
Copyright Examiners, it would be impossible to have peer review or supervisor review of all
approved claims.").
225. Admittedly, the Copyright Act contains a presumption of validity for registered
copyrights. Section 410(c) provides that in judicial proceedings, a "certificate of registration made
before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence
of the validity of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012).
This does not mean, however, that the statute requires courts simply to accept the
copyrightability of the items registered by the Office without further examination. The statutory
presumption is rebuttable. Thus, after the plaintiff introduces evidence of registration, the
defendant can show that the plaintiffs copyrights are invalid. See, e.g., Fonar Corp. v. Domenick,
105 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1997).
Moreover, to the extent that the Copyright Office's separability determinations were
grounded on a particular test for separability, courts choosing a different test could not be
thought to have deferred to the administrative decisions of the Office. For example, the
Copyright Office's approach to separability prior to Star Athletica required both the aesthetics
and the functional aspects of the useful article to remain after separation. See Ginsburg, supra
note 4, at 11-17. Courts varied in the degree to which they used the Copyright Office's
conceptual separability test, however. See sources cited supra note 77 (regarding the numerous
separability tests used by various courts).
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features incorporated into the designs of useful articles. 226 Until that
issues, the draft Compendium contains some suggestive language.
Section 906.8 states that copyright law "does protect the creative form
of a work of artistic craftsmanship" and that by contrast to a lamp,
which is considered a useful article, "a three-dimensional floral design
affixed to the base of a lamp ... does not have an intrinsic utilitarian
function [and] the U.S. Copyright Office may register those design
features if they are separable from the functional aspects of the lamp
and if they are sufficiently original and creative."227  Does the
italicized language suggest that a higher-than-usual level of
originality and creativity will be required for the registration of such
works? Will the Copyright Office examiners register overall aesthetic
forms of useful articles if they are "creative"-a term that is nowhere
defined? Will the examiners decide whether the PGS features
themselves have "an intrinsic utilitarian function" (in addition to the
intrinsic utilitarian function of the useful work in which they are
embedded) in order to make the separability and registrability
determination? If so, this could lead to more liberal registrations in
practice. Particularly in light of the vagueness and imprecision of
Star Athletica's new separability test, Copyright Office examiners may
end up liberalizing their registrations of PGS elements associated
with useful articles. If that is the case, courts should not engage in an
automatic, unquestioning acceptance of the Copyright Office's
approach. And as the registration decisions by Copyright Office
functionaries do not necessarily track or make explicit the
two-pronged analysis called for by Star Athletica, to what exactly the
courts should defer becomes a nice question. In any event, the
Copyright Office approach to individual registrations will ultimately
say nothing about the aggregate registration strategy that may be the
less obvious but more dangerous threat posed by Star Athletica's
approach.
VI. IS THE BROADEST DEFINITION OF FUNCTION THE ANSWER?
Perhaps one way to deal with the issue of aggregate
registration effects is to adopt a generally applicable definition of
"function" that could reduce the copyrightability of PGS elements once
they are integrated into useful works. Even under the Star Athletica
test, if the PGS elements themselves are functional, they would not be
copyrightable regardless of their aesthetic appeal. But how should
function be defined? The Court in Star Athletica eschewed any
226. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 2017 COMPENDIUM, supra note 216, § 924.
227. Id. § 906.8 (emphasis added).
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attempt to analyze how to draw the line between functional industrial
design and non-functional applied art-effectively assuming an easily
identifiable and binary distinction between the useful uniform and its
separable decoration. The Court therefore implicitly-but without
analysis or discussion-adopted a narrow and mechanical conception
of function for separability purposes. 228
Professors McKenna and Sprigman correctly suggest that
functionality is not "a straightforward empirical question," and they
chide courts for failing to recognize "functionality's essential
normativity" while approaching the question "reductively and
intuitively." 229 After all, in reality, the aesthetic and utilitarian are
arrayed on a spectrum. Aesthetic elements can often serve a variety
of functions, and even what appear to be purely mechanical objects
can be seen as aesthetically appealing. Moreover, there are often
great variations in the ratio of aesthetic to functional characteristics
in attractive useful works. Some scholars have asserted an extremely
broad conception of functionality and have suggested that aesthetic
elements in useful articles should only be considered separable and
copyrightable if they are completely
non-functional in any context. 230 One of the core failings of the Star
Athletica decision is the Supreme Court's asserted reliance on
textualism as a way of rejecting those scholars' argument and of
sidestepping functionality's normativity.
A. The Court's Thin Textualism
Star Athletica does not parse the statutory language to
determine whether cheerleading uniforms are useful articles and
whether the same definition of function is to be applied to the
separability analysis as to the identification of useful articles. Even
though the majority purports to find its new separability standard in
228. See Tyler T. Ochoa, What Is a "Useful Article" in Copyright Law After Star
Athletica?, 166 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 105, 110-11 (2017) (noting that "the majority opinion
identified the utilitarian aspects of the cheerleading uniforms only implicitly" and suggesting
that because "the Sixth Circuit's five-question approach is consistent with the Supreme Court's
two-part approach[,] . . . . a lower court should expressly consider the first three questions of the
Sixth Circuit's five-question approach, before turning to the Supreme Court's modification of the
last two questions of the Sixth Circuit's approach." (emphasis omitted)).
229. McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 72, at 516.
230. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 53; Buccafusco
& Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12, at 119; see also McKenna, supra note 72, at
132.
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the language of the Copyright Act itself,23 1 its statutory interpretation
is not the only plausible one.
The majority simply assumes that cheerleading uniforms are
useful articles-presumably, as the Sixth Circuit had held, because
they cover the body, wick away sweat, and withstand athletic
movements. 232 Once having categorized the uniforms as useful in this
way, though, the majority focused only on the PGS elements of the
uniforms and not on any functional role played by those features when
integrated in the useful work. But the statutory framework seems
more complex than that. The focus of the statute could reasonably be
said to be on the relationship of the PGS "features" to the useful
work's "utilitarian aspects." 23 3 In other words, the statute's use of
utility could be seen as a two-step rather than a one-step exercise. If
so, a different analysis might result.
The distinction in the statutory language between work,
feature, and article arguably makes a difference, even though the
Court in Star Athletica did not focus on it. According to the statute, a
PGS work is directly eligible for copyright protection if it is not
incorporated in a useful article. 2 34 If it is, however, then separability
analysis must ensue. How does one know whether a PGS
work-embodied in some kind of medium-is incorporated in a useful
work? This first inquiry requires the fact-finder to determine whether
the article as a whole is useful. This simply requires assessing
231. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017) ("This is
not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy, but rather 'depends solely on statutory
interpretation.' . . . We thus begin and end our inquiry with the text, giving each word its
'ordinary, contemporary, common meaning."' (citations omitted)).
232. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 491 (6th Cir. 2015), affd,
137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). The district court, unlike the Sixth Circuit, found that the function of the
uniforms with their designs was to identify the wearers as cheerleaders. Varsity Brands, Inc. v.
Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *1, *8-9 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014),
vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), affd, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). The Sixth Circuit, rejecting
this interpretation of their function, asserted that the uniforms served garment-like functions of
covering the body. Varsity Brands, 799 F.3d at 492.
233. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2012).
234. Id. The Copyright Act defines PGS works to include
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models,
and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works
of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian
aspects of the article.
Id. (emphases added).
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whether the article has "an intrinsic utilitarian function."235 The
separability analysis has not yet started at this point; it is simply teed
up if a useful article is identified. Once one concludes that the design
is of a useful article, then one must look at the separability of its PGS
features, if any. The separability definition refers to the separability
of PGS features from "the utilitarian aspects" of the article. But those
"utilitarian functions" are not statutorily defined and are not
necessarily limited to the single intrinsic utility required to identify a
useful article. Just because, as a triggering matter, something can be
characterized as a useful article because it has an intrinsic utilitarian
function does not mean that the same definition of function must be
the only one to be applied for the rest of the statutory separability
inquiry thereafter. Indeed, the statute, in its use of the plural tense,
seems to contemplate the possibility of multiple utilitarian aspects. 236
And it is reasonable to interpret it as requiring a determination of
whether the identified PGS features can (each? together?) be
separated from the various types of utility attributable to the useful
article. Even when a utilitarian function can be identified, this does
not mean that no other overlay functions also exist.
Despite the Court's claim to be simply discovering its test in
the text, 237 the Court's interpretation was not in fact dictated by the
Copyright Act. The majority's failure to analyze the text thus reflects
an unhelpfully thin textualism. Although the Court did not explicitly
define function, its analysis implicitly chose the narrow definition in
the definition of useful articles to use in the separability part of the
inquiry as well. 2 38 This was a judicial, not a legislative, choice.
235. Id. The Act defines a useful article as "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An
article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article."' Id.
236. Id.
237. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010.
238. See id. at 1008. The Court tried to read utility out altogether (once it accepted the
relevant item as a useful article) by defining its frame as copyright inclusion rather than
functionality exclusion. Id. at 1013-14. Yet by avoiding situations where the integrated aesthetic
elements help to enhance, improve, or distinguish the article's functions from those of its
competitors, the Court implicitly adopted a narrow and limiting definition.
As Professors Kaminski and Rub have noted, copyright has a persistent framing problem-a
problem magnified by the fact that most courts do not recognize the choices they make in
framing when they apply copyright doctrines. See Kaminski & Rub, supra note 69, at 1104-05.
The fact that the Court chose a narrow definition of function had an unacknowledged impact on
the outcome of its separability analysis. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1013-14. Effectively,
what the majority did in Star Athletica was to limit the inquiry into function by narrowing its
consideration of utility to one basic, core function of the overall designs at issue either that the
parties agreed to or that could generally be agreed to be useful (and that the Copyright Office
has affirmed through registration). This is not consistent with the goals of the statute (and even
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B. Non-Functionality Instead of Functionality?
Perhaps the majority's avoidance of function in its statutory
interpretation can be explained as a shift in focus from the functional
to the non-functional. Historically, the key issue in copyrightability
analysis was whether the aesthetic elements enhanced or amplified
the useful article's function, and the lower court arguments in Star
Athletica had focused on the functional role played by the graphic
elements. 239 Star Athletica switched the focus, looking not at the
function of the PGS features when integrated in useful articleS 240 but
at whether those features could be non-functional. In other words, in
looking to imagine whether the PGS features in the useful work can
stand alone as a PGS work, the Star Athletica majority could be
signaling a need to focus not on the PGS features as they function but
to ask whether they can exist without function. Even if PGS features
are sometimes functional in some ways when integrated, can they ever
be imagined as non-functional? Can they be separated without
bringing along with them the functionalities of the underlying
utilitarian work in which they appear?
This interpretation could explain why the case came out the
way it did: to the extent that Varsity Brands' designs seek to use
optical illusions to give the impression of thinner and more athletic
wearers, these optical illusions in Varsity Brands' designs only work
its language). See 17 U.S.C. § 101. This approach is likely to lead to overly protective results in a
potentially material number of cases.
239. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007-08. For example, Professors Buccafusco and
Fromer suggested in their amicus brief that optical illusion elements designed to allow the
wearer to be perceived a certain way-as younger, leaner, more attractive-should be considered
utilitarian features. See Brief for Professors Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8-9, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S.
Ct. 1002 (2017) (No. 15-866); see also Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at
56; Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12, at 126. The Court did not
address this argument.
240. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. The majority in Star Athletica did not
explicitly try to define function-refusing to address, for example, the argument that the
cheerleading uniform designs at issue in the case contained aesthetic features that were
designed to improve the uniforms' function. See id. at 1014. It simply assumed that the useful
objects at issue were cheerleader uniforms. See Ochoa, supra note 228, at 106 (agreeing that both
the parties and the Court "implicitly assumed, without analysis, that the cheerleading uniforms
at issue were 'useful articles."'). It then simply sought to identify whether or not the decorations
at issue should be conceived as applied art. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014. Even Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence appeared to assume that the useful articles were the cheerleading
uniforms but argued that separability analysis was unnecessary because Varsity Brands was
seeking protection for its two-dimensional fabric designs as reproduced in the registered
drawings and photographs. See id. at 1018-19 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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to give such impressions when worn on the body.241 Their functions of
making someone look thin, athletic, and good evaporate when the
aesthetic designs are not integrated in use in a cheerleading uniform.
They can then be viewed as art.
Still, focusing on non-function does not eliminate the need to
address function. By definition, one has to adopt a definition of
function that will be used to distinguish between the functional and
the non-functional. Even reading Star Athletica as embracing a
non-functionality focus does not eliminate attention to the relationship
between the aesthetic and the functional aspects in a hybrid useful
article. More troublingly, the focus on abstract non-function invites a
narrow interpretation of function (such as the one implicitly adopted
by the Star Athletica Court itself) and opens the door to expansive
protections of PGS elements of useful articles-despite the clear
intention of Congress to impose a "high threshold to copyrightability of
useful articles." 242
Professors Buccafusco and Fromer have argued that "just
because a design is non-functional in one medium it is necessarily
non-functional in all media." 243 Beginning from the proposition that
"[c]opyright protection should extend only to reproductions of the
design in media where it does not have a function[J" 2 44 and adopting a
broad definition of function, they would reject copyright protection for
any aesthetic features that could be deemed to have a function in any
context even if they could be non-functional in others. It is because of
this that they assert the Court made a mistake and "produced an
erroneous outcome." 245
But the Star Athletica decision essentially rejects that view,
suggesting instead that the Court made a choice rather than a
mistake. The Star Athletica Court effectively decided that if art could
be non-functional when not incorporated in a useful work, it would be
arbitrary not to provide it copyright protection. On the Buccafusco
and Fromer view, copyright should be denied to otherwise protectable
work simply because it might make a useful article more visually
attractive. This seems to go much further than congressional intent,
however, which sought to distinguish applied art and industrial
241. See also Marchese, supra note 115, at 378-79. Indeed, the placement of the design
elements was "determined by the three dimensional structure of the garment." Id. at 412.
242. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 2.
243. Buccafusco & Fromer, Forgetting Functionality, supra note 12, at 126.
244. Id.
245. Id.
2018] 769
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. [Vol. 20:3:709
design. 246 Allowing more and more abstract and socially determined
notions of function to limit the copyrightability of otherwise original
PGS features would be an indirect way of reining in copyright. Those
who believe that copyright protection has metastasized might think
this a good thing. On the other hand, without boundaries, this kind of
approach could overly restrict the scope of copyright. It also focuses
too much on medium rather than on context. 247 As the Star Athletica
majority worried, a boundless definition of function for purposes of
justifying exclusion could eliminate copyright in applied art. 2 4 8 One
cannot reasonably say that function should be relegated only to the
realm of patent, and then say that virtually anything that could be
considered useful with respect to any definition of function cannot be
copyrightable and must look only to patent. Function and form cannot
be distinguished in a neutral-culturally and legally
acontextual-way. To draw the line, an underlying policy must be
developed. So the question is: Against what metric does one define the
kind of functional use of aesthetics that triggers separability analysis?
If protecting the incorporated art would not necessarily
replicate and therefore protect the underlying useful object, it is hard
to see what policy would be furthered by refusing copyright
protection-unless the designs themselves are deemed to function as
useful articles. 249 But a definition of function without limits would
246. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5668 (noting the intent of the statutory language to "draw as clear a line as possible between
copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrightable works of industrial design").
247. It can reasonably be said that both art and function are perceived in context. If I
were to see Marcel Duchamp's famous urinal in a museum, I would interpret it as art, or at least
as a comment on what society considers art. See J. Alex Ward, Copyrighting Context: Law for
Plumbing's Sake, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 159, 162 (1993). For an article describing the
Fountain story, see, for example, Martin Gayford, Duchamp's Fountain: The Practical Joke That
Launched an Artistic Revolution, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 16, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/art/3671180/Duchamps-Fountain-The-practical-joke-that-
launched-an-artistic-revolution.html [https://perma.cclRR3B-JKFP]. I would appreciate the
urinal in its relationship to the context in which it is placed and in conversation with the other
aesthetic objects with which it is displayed. My appreciation of the urinal would not be as a
urinal, but as the urinal as an expressive or representational object. If, on the other hand, a man
were to see the urinal in situ in a bathroom, he would focus on its usefulness and subconsciously
primarily assess whether its design-the slope of its sides, the curvature and height of its bottom
edge-efficiently accomplished its intended use as a urinary receptacle.
248. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1014 (2017)
("Were we to accept [Star Athletica's] argument that the only protectable features are those that
play absolutely no role in an article's function, we would effectively abrogate the rule of Mazer
and read 'applied art' out of the statute.").
249. As discussed in Part V.A above, common policy rationales offered by scholars for
denying copyright protection to useful works include channeling and avoidance of backdoor
patents and protecting competition in the useful works market, itself.
770
THE NEW SEPARABILITY
lead to problematic underprotection. If any function at all, no matter
how broadly defined, is sufficient to make the art itself inherently
functional, then art will sometimes be copyrightable and sometimes
not. This is likely to lead to a very confusing state of affairs. The Star
Athletica Court worried that it would eliminate protection for applied
art.2 5 0 Still, one does not have to go as far as Buccafusco and Fromer
to criticize the Court's approach to function. This Article argues that
the Court's real mistake in Star Athletica was its assumption that the
only relevant function for separability purposes was the definition of
useful article. This belief underlay the majority's refusal to articulate
a theory by which to distinguish between those functions that should
preclude copyright protections and those that should not. Even
without agreeing with Buccafusco and Fromer's suggestion that PGS
features should only be protected by copyright when they are "purely
expressive" 2 5 1 and have no utility however defined, one can still
criticize Star Athletica for refusing to provide the tools to separate its
newly adopted categories of copyrightable function and
noncopyrightable function.
C. What Kind of Functionality Should Count for Copyright
Separability Purposes? A Middle-Ground Approach
Why is the majority incorrect in its implicit assessment of
function in Star Athletica? First, as a matter of practical reality, one
can imagine a spectrum of functions that aesthetic elements might
enhance and that they may themselves accomplish. The multiple
relevant functions of integrated aesthetic elementS 252 can include
Professors Buccafusco and Fromer argue that "[als a matter of logic, the Copyright Act
cannot both protect the expressive features of the uniforms and preserve from protection their
functional aspects when those expressive features and functional aspects are one and the same."
Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 84. But if, for example, making a
wearer look good can be characterized as an expressive use, then logic suggests that there is no
end point to Buccafusco and Fromer's argument. Depending on framing, is it possible to
characterize virtually any use of aesthetic elements as functional in one way or another? If so,
what PGS elements are left to be copyrightable?
250. See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1014.
251. Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 70.
252. The Court seems to begin from the proposition, as does the statute, that there are
some PGS articles that have no intrinsic function (presumably other than artworks providing
aesthetic enjoyment or appreciation). See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at
1008. This Article refers to those as "Function 0 works." With respect to items that do have
intrinsic functions beyond aesthetic appreciation, one can identify and describe their functions at
the most basic level-call these "Function 1 features." This is presumably what the Copyright
Act means when it refers to useful articles as those that have "an intrinsic function" other than
representation or communication. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. Presumably, that Function 1
characterization is the core utility that consensus would suggest is necessary as the basis for all
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mechanical or technological functions (making the item work),
marketing functions (enhancing the salable value), branding functions
(identifying the source), expressive functions (communicating to the
audience), and decorative functions (increasing the item's appeal). In
turn, the mechanical functions can be broadly or narrowly construed.
For example, as Professors Buccafusco and Fromer argued in their
amicus brief in Star Athletica, the Varsity Brands designs took
advantage of optical illusions to make the wearer look thinner and
more attractive. 253  Second, lived experience indicates that the
other possible overlay utilities for that particular article. So, as to Function 1 in connection with
the items in Star Athletica itself, the basic function of a cheerleading uniform would be (as the
lower courts described it) covering the body, allowing for movement, and wicking sweat. See
Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Althletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *1, *8-9 (W.D.
Tenn. March 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2015), aff'd, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017). If the
decorative designs of chevrons and color blocking were removed from the underlying fabric, the
overall shape of the article could still function as some kind of garment or dress and even as a
type of cheerleading uniform. The decorations might improve its appeal as a cheerleading
uniform, but it could still operate as a garment or a cheerleader uniform even if it had no
decorative embellishments (which such uniforms did not have in the past). See, e.g., Brief of
Respondents at 56-58, Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (No.
15-866).
But there are doubtless many overlay functions one can imagine. Function 2 of cheerleading
uniforms may include, in addition to Function 1, the function of slimming the body; making the
wearer look taller, thinner, or curvier; or addressing some other appearance-related aspect
suggesting strength, power, or agility. Function 3 could include identifying the school for which
the cheerleader is cheering. Function 4 could be hiding sweat stains. Function 5 could relate to
the look of all of the uniforms together from the distance of the bleachers. Function 6 could be
the particular visual effects of the whole cheerleading squad working together to create moving
images during a cheer. Admittedly, if one chose to look only at what might be called the more
culturally defined or neurologically defined aspects of function-making the outfit look good-
such elements would not themselves work as uniforms. The underlying uniform would be
necessary for the secondary functional effects to work. Still, the fact that the basic scaffold is
necessary to enable the upper level or overlay functions does not mean that those functions do
not exist, and the fact that those functions depend on other levels of functionality does not mean
they should be ignored.
In practice, if a fact-finder only looks at Function 1, it will frequently be easy to find that
PGS elements are separable from Function 1-level descriptions of useful works. In Star Athletica
itself, for example, if the Court had considered Function 2-meaning if it had noted that the
particular configuration of the designs as applied onto the uniform had the effect, in addition to
the Function 1 utilities, of making the wearers look thinner or more athletic through taking
advantage of optical illusions-then separability from Function 2 would have been harder to
find.
253. See Brief for Professors Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 239, at 24. For example, Professors Buccafusco and Fromer
argued both in an amicus brief in Star Athletica and in a separate law review article that
components of a design that "enhanc[e] the wearer's atractiveness" should be considered
functional. Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 81-82 (quoting Jovani
Fashion, Ltd. v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (arguing that
aspects of fashion are functional when they affect the perception of the wearer's body); see also
Brief for Professors Christopher Buccafusco and Jeanne Fromer as Amici Curiae Supporting
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functional importance of aesthetic features in a useful article varies on
a spectrum as well. The aesthetic components can be important or not
so central from a variety of vantage points.
If all original artistic features integrated in useful works
should not be excluded from copyright if they accomplish any of those
types of functions, however, then one must choose among them. 2 5 4 In
doing so, one must ask: (1) On what basis to select which of those
functions should "count"255 for copyright purposes and which should
not, and (2) Where function and aesthetics interpenetrate, how much
functionality should shift the PGS features out of copyright? 256 Should
biologically, neurologically, and psychologically grounded functions of
aesthetic elements count to prohibit copyright? On which side of the
line should extrinsic, marketing-supportive functions such as
attractiveness for salability purposes be placed?
Answering these questions requires appeal to underlying policy
standards to help direct that choice. 257 From where should those
policies be recruited? One approach is to look at the goals of the
Copyright Act in protecting communicative expression, channeling
creative works to the right IP domains, and promoting competition in
functional works markets. Those IP policies would not limit the types
of functions leading to inseparability to the very narrow conception
adopted by the Court in Star Athletica. Under the Copyright Act, an
article can only be considered a useful article if its intrinsic function is
Petitioner, supra note 239, at 24; cf. Hughes, supra note 184, at 1285 (proposing, in the context of
aesthetic functionality doctrine in trademark law, "a vigorous aesthetic functionality doctrine
that prevents private parties from gaining market advantages that arise from exploiting widely-
shared, preexisting cognitive, psychological, or aesthetic responses among consumers").
254. It should be noted that the meaning of "function" is deemed to differ in trademark,
utility patent, design patent, and copyright, even though the language used is the same. See Lee
& Sunder, supra note 134, at 531.
255. See McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 72, at 523, 535-36.
256. See id. at 517-18 ("[C]opyright's useful articles doctrine [like the other IP
functionality doctrines] really has to determine the point at which the balance between
ornamentality and functionality tips too strongly in the direction of function.").
257. See id. at 544. Scholars have criticized copyright for failing to have a theory of
usefulness that would rationalize the differential treatment of articles that appeal to consumers
on the levels of both aesthetics and function. For example, Professors McKenna and Sprigman
have argued that copyright lacks a theory of what usefulness means so that courts can exclude
intrinsically useful articles from copyright. Id. at 536-39 (addressing failure of theory to explain
copyright's differential treatment of apparel and toys and noting that "although it is obvious that
most articles appeal on both aesthetic and functional levels, copyright lacks a theory of how
much function is sufficient to remove a particular article, or class of articles, from its domain. ...
The only consistency in copyright's treatment of utility is its ad hoc nature."). The Star Athletica
Court implicitly adopted a theory of function quite inconsistent with these scholars' vision of
what a theory of usefulness could do to rationalize the treatment of applied art in useful works.
Compare McKenna & Sprigman, supra note 72, at 535-39, with Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at
1010.
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not "to portray the appearance of the article or to convey
information." 258 The statute in its terms makes a distinction between
mechanical function and expressive function; thus, it implicitly
distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic functions.
As Professor Burk has put it, "utility in copyright is not
concerned with . . . informational or aesthetic 'uses;' rather it is
practical or operational 'uses' that are excluded from the copyright
protection." 259  Admittedly, "conveying information" is not a
predictable or self-defining standard. For example, functional works
often convey some information. In the cheer context, uniforms convey,
inter alia, numbers, colors, names, styles, schools, and optical
illusions. As for aesthetic elements, there are many that convey little
information while they effectuate various different functions of the
sorts discussed above. Should it be said that PGS elements that make
the wearer look thin are actually conveying information? Does the
fact that these elements are used in an interactive way in response to
the audience's preexisting cognitive and perceptual biases make them
communicative and therefore non-functional for separability
purposes? 260 Do they carry "an objective message about the physical
world or its deterministic functions"? 26 1  Still, even if the outer
contours of "conveying information" are not crystal clear, the statutory
commitment to copyright protection for aesthetic features embodied in
media intended to convey information provides one policy clue for
thinking about the meaning of function for copyright.
As for the statute's reference to "intrinsic" functions, this term
too is susceptible of multiple interpretations. Still, on one reading, the
"intrinsic" focus directs attention only to the characteristics and
functions of the article itself. In the cheerleading uniform context,
258. 17 U.S.C § 101 (2012).
259. Burk, supra note 145, at 590.
260. Professors Buccafusco and Fromer answer "no," asserting that it would be "an
unnatural reading" of the statute to suggest that graphic visual designs on a garment convey
information, rather than portray their appearance, and that such design elements do not merely
convey information but also directly affect the appearance of the external thing whose
appearance they are being used to change. Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note
12, at 75 n.119. The statute itself does not clarify which reading is "right," so an alternative
reading is arguably available-one that would characterize the entire function of the placement
of the design as communicating a particular visual image to the viewer. This would interpret
conveying information more broadly, as something akin to a notion of communicative interaction.
See also Ochoa, supra note 228, at 117 ("[T]he reason a blank cheerleading uniform is less useful
than a colorful one is because it fails to convey information; but conveying information is a
'utilitarian function' that is excluded from the definition of a 'useful article.' A blank cheerleading
uniform remains equally useful in all of the ways that matter to the statutory definition.").
261. Burk, supra note 145, at 607 (describing the different kinds of information that can
be conveyed in scientific literary work).
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those intrinsic functions could reasonably include not only the body
coverage functions of garments but also the fact that the designs used
optical illusions to make their wearers look thinner or stronger. 262
Whether referring to cheerleading uniform designs or to camouflage,
the designs in use serve specific visual functions whose perceptual
impact would be predictable and clearly definable. 263  In other
contexts, features responsive to the visual or auditory needs of
visually impaired or hearing-impaired users could also reasonably be
considered intrinsic in this sense.264 By contrast, functions-other
than those such as marketing or branding functions-could
reasonably be considered extrinsic. 265 Similarly, abstract statements
of function-such as generally making the wearer "look good" or
functioning to attract-would be understandable only by reference to
external, changeable, variable, culturally- grounded assessments and
262. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's Function, supra note 12, at 56 (noting that
many features of garment design-whether two- or three-dimensional-"exploit features of
human visual perception and optical illusions to influence the way in which the wearer's body is
perceived").
263. See, e.g., id. at 56-60 (describing such optical illusions and their effect on the
perception of the wearer); Marchese, supra note 115, at 412 (arguing that the arrangement of
basic shapes on the body in order to emphasize particular areas and to achieve an "external
effect of modifying one's appearance" should be considered an uncopyrightable function and that
"[t]he graphics are inseparable from this function because they dictate the method by which the
function operates").
264. See Ghosh, supra note 5, at 98.
265. This may be where I depart from Professors Buccafusco and Fromer's view that in a
"dual-nature" context (in which design components are both expressive and utilitarian), any
contribution of a PGS feature to viewers' perception of a useful work should be considered
intrinsically functional and therefore uncopyrightable. See Buccafusco & Fromer, Fashion's
Function, supra note 12, at 83. This Article takes the position that there is a material difference
between aesthetic elements making the wearer look "thin" by contrast to making her look "good"
for purposes of separability. Optical illusions that achieve the former are more objectively
identifiable (although, of course, there is bound to be debate over degrees of thinness and
effectiveness). Extending functionality to design elements that simply make the wearer look
"good," though, which Fashion's Function can be read to do, seems to take the functionality of
aesthetic elements too far. See id. at 55. To the extent that Buccafusco and Fromer only mean to
characterize specific design choices that are responsive to perceptual tricks as functional, this
Article agrees. See id. Beyond that, I believe an interpretation of function at a subjective level of
'looking good" is too vague, abstract, and contestable. Professors Buccafusco and Fromer argue
that whether a design feature should be considered solely expressive and therefore copyrightably
non-functional should be assessed by the views of both consumers and designers or experts. Id.
at 80. Perhaps if only an expert's view were used-focusing on the employment of perceptual
techniques designed to accomplish particular identifiable ends-the uncertainty of the subjective
'"looking good on' function" could be mitigated. Id. at 103.
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would thus be harder to identify as the kind of "intrinsic" function
identified in the statute. 266
The middle-ground approach to function would have the benefit
of providing a generally applicable rule that would be implicitly
responsive to the anticompetitive concerns raised by aggregate
copyright registration strategies. 267  If the PGS elements had
objectively definable perceptual and neurological impacts of an
identifiable sort, then they would be considered inseparable. Beyond
those types of functions, however, the analysis becomes much more
subjective, so a presumption of separability could be
workable-subject to a copyright abuse defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, Star Athletica's new separability test
promises illusory simplicity. The issues raised by hybrid works cannot
simply be resolved by one vague and seemingly simple test (which is
applied differently by the majority and the dissent even in its own
context). Both steps of the new separability inquiry are dangerously
indeterminate and could well be interpreted as opening the door to the
routine copyrightability of useful articles with attractive
designs--contrary to the Copyright Act and the congressional plan.
Regardless of its elusive qualities, then, Star Athletica could end up
being a radical step in the expansion of copyright. This is because
instead of undemanding predictability, the new separability will invite
extensive litigation pushing the boundaries of protectability with
respect to functional works. Even if courts winnow out the worst of
the opportunistic cases, there is a nonnegligible danger that the
doctrine will veer from a rational track. This is particularly likely if
early cases begin by overprotecting PGS elements in hybrid works.
Fake simplicity in an environment of otherwise increasing IP property
claims will tend toward overprotection, whatever its claimed limits.
266. Cf. Samuelson, supra note 134, at 357 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-05
(1879) for identifying "ornamentality, appeal to taste, and explanation as characteristics of
expressiveness in copyrighted works").
Professors Lee and Sunder argue that when look and feel" expresses the zeitgeist, extending
principles of IP law undermines innovation and cultural cohesion. Lee'& Sunder, supra note 134,
at 534-35. I am not arguing here that exclusive rights should not be relaxed when dealing with
design as zeitgeist. As Professors Lee and Sunder recognize, copyright seeks to deal with this
issue through its prohibition on the copyrightability of scenes a faire. Id. The point in this Part is
that cultural standardization seems too unpredictable and variable a basis to ground
separability analysis.
267. Cf. Ghosh, supra note 5, at 99 ("Copyright protection that inhibits competition and
innovation should be filtered out through functionality.").
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There is reason to worry that this presents a greater danger than the
embarrassment of tests available under prior separability law.
All, of course, is not lost. The Star Athletica Court made sure
to note that it had not opined on whether Varsity Brands' designs on
its cheerleader uniforms, even though separable, would satisfy the
rest of the copyrightability requirements. 2 68 It therefore punted the
question of artistic functionality to lower courts applying downstream
copyright doctrines: originality, exclusion doctrines (such as merger
doctrine, scenes & faire, and the prohibition on copyright for processes,
systems, and methods of operation), and infringement analysis.
Query whether lower courts will read originality more stringently in
useful works cases; whether they will be quick to find merger, scenes &
faire, or processes; or whether they will apply filtration analysis to
substantial similarity inquiries for infringement in useful work cases
because of the fundamental functionality they involve.
Still, even if the other doctrines can compensate for some of the
indeterminacy of the new approach and push back against
overprotection, both the new separability test and the other limiting
doctrines focus on the copyrightability of individual designs. Even if
finding separability and granting copyright is reasonable in any given
individual case, it does not address the hidden issue regarding the
aggregate effects of multiple copyright registrations for designs in a
similar vein.
While the administrative solution of relying on the Copyright
Office might have some surface appeal, it is not workable.
Alternatively, it would be possible to craft a copyright abuse claim to
capture problematic aggregate registration strategies. But this is not
a general rule; at best it provides an equitable ground for excusing a
defendant's copying in an individual case. One potential alternative
ignored by Star Athletica could have been a definition of function that
could reduce the likely success of aggregate design copyright
registrations as anticompetitive tools in the underlying useful article
markets. Aesthetic elements can have a variety of communicative and
noncommunicative functions. Some of them-such as those in Star
Athletica itself-can employ human perceptual quirks in order to
affect the ways in which their users appear. So a binary distinction
between aesthetic and functional vision does not in fact represent
reality or properly ground policy. Still, some kind of line must be
drawn along the broad spectrum of possible functionalities, lest
268. See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1012 n.1 (2017)
("We do not today hold that the surface decorations are copyrightable. We express no opinion on
whether these works are sufficiently original to qualify for copyright protection or on whether
any other prerequisite of a valid copyright has been satisfied." (citation omitted)).
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aesthetic works lose too much protection. The Star Athletica Court
could have attempted to define the relevant functionality line. A
policy-infused interpretation of functionality grounded on statutory
commitments would have allowed it to be sensitive to Congress's
desires to forestall anticompetitive behavior in consumer product
markets, to protect expressive works, and to maintain IP boundaries
by channeling IP problems to their appropriate domains. Instead, the
Court used a dessicated approach to textualism in order implicitly to
adopt a narrow, mechanical, and unsatisfactory definition of utility.
Had it chosen a middle ground based on congressional IP policy, the
threat of overprotection would loom far less large.
